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1. Introduction  
1.1 Academic and practical motivation 
 
The goal of my study is to determine whether the earnings acceleration (EA hereafter), de-
fined as the change in earnings growth, conveys value relevant information to the pricing of 
stocks. Secondly, I also attempt to determine what drives this EA information value.  Overall, 
EA is stated as a fundamental element in the traditional earnings-based equity valuation mod-
els (for example, Gordon 1959; Malkiel and Cragg 1970; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005), 
but has so far received only limited academic attention, thus leaving the empirical evidence 
scarce. However, the valuation theory, investment managers
1
, financial analysts
2
, and text-
books covering horizontal financial statement analysis
3
 suggest that the EA information is 
valuable in the pricing of equities. Cao et al. (2011) is one of the few papers that study EA 
systematically, and my thesis contributes to this U.S research with European data. 
My research starts by studying, whether the EA information is valuable in predicting contem-
poraneous long-term and short-term stock returns, whether the EA information explains future 
earnings, and whether the analysts appear to use the EA information while revising their earn-
ings forecasts. After studying whether the EA conveys valuable information, I study whether 
this information value derives from the cash flow or accruals components of earnings, wheth-
er the EA information value depends on the firm size, whether it changes over time, and final-
ly, whether both the annual and quarterly earnings reports convey similar information. 
The prior literature of the valuation of earnings growth serves as the fundamental cornerstone 
of my study. I begin with the earnings-based equity pricing model of Ohlson and Juettner-
                                                 
 
1
 See for example The Paradox of Growth Investing, by AllianceBernstein Investments, and the Bernstein 
Quantitative Handbook  
2
 E.g. Ford Equity Research uses an earnings trend analysis, which measures the acceleration or decelera-
tion of the growth of firms’ quarterly operating earnings per share after adjusting for earnings volatility, in eval-
uating stocks. 
3
 William O’Neil, IBD (Investor Business Daily)’s founder, explains the importance of earnings accelera-
tion in several books including ‘‘24 Essential Lessons for Investment Success: Learn the Most Important In-
vestment Techniques from the Founder of Investor’s Business Daily’’ (1999), ‘‘How to Make Money in 
Stocks—A Winning System in Good Times or Bad’’ (2002), and ‘‘The Successful Investor: What 80 Million 
People Need to Know to Invest Profitably and Avoid Big Losses’’ (2003). Finally, books that discuss earnings 
acceleration include Vega (1994), Sethna (1997), Fabozzi (1998), and Mintz et al. (1999), among others. 
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Nauroth (2005), which Chen and Zhang (2007) develop further. My approach differs from the 
existing theory by focusing on the realized, instead of expected, earnings acceleration in order 
to explain current stock returns. Thus, I examine, whether the investors are able to extract 
information from the current change in earnings growth variable (EA) beyond that revealed 
by the current earnings or the current earnings growth. Also, Cao et al. (2011) use this explor-
atory approach of current change in their study. Another unique feature in my approach is the 
inclusion of the EA as an explanatory variable in the Easton and Harris’ (1991) contempora-
neous empirical model, while the prior studies of Aboody et al. (2004), Copeland et al. 
(2004), and Chen and Zhang (2007) use it only as a control variable. Thirdly, my EA research 
is also in accordance with the principles of the common-sized horizontal financial statement 
analysis, which is based on the comparison of growth rates in individual line items over time 
(e.g. Lundholm and Sloan 2006; Stickney et al. 2007; Penman 2010; Cao et al. 2011). The 
final extension of my study is the approach of not only detecting, but also explaining which 
factors drive the EA information value by studying separately the operating cash flow and the 
accruals components of earnings.   
My overall findings support the view that the reported EA numbers reveal incremental and 
valuable pricing information. As a conclusion of the academic and practical motivation, EA is 
a widely used concept in many investment strategies and the expected EA is also theoretically 
defined as a fundamental element in several traditional earnings-based equity valuation mod-
els. I extend the study of Cao et al. (2011) to the European setting and find significant results 
supporting that EA conveys valuable information with both annual and quarterly data.  
 
1.2 Contribution to the literature 
 
Since the academic field of the EA research is relatively unexploited, I contribute to the litera-
ture in several ways. Firstly, I geographically extend the U.S. research by providing evidence 
that the EA phenomenon also applies to the European markets. Secondly, after showing that 
the EA does convey information, I extend the literature by assessing this information value 
from the perspective of both annual and quarterly earnings growth. To my knowledge, this 
kind of approach has not yet been tested. The final unique extension of my study is to observe 
what affects the EA information value. To do this, I study whether the information in EA de-
rives from cash, accruals, or both components of earnings, whether it depends on the firm 
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size, and whether the information value changes over time. Overall, my study further deepens 
the knowledge of the explanatory power of EA in determining the stock prices.  
 
1.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
 
Cao et al. (2011) find significant evidence with the U.S data that the EA conveys valuable 
information about stock returns, future earnings, and analyst forecast revisions. My research 
question is twofold, and divides further into several hypotheses. Firstly, I study whether the 
EA information is valuable with the European data, and secondly I study where this value 
derives from. Below, I describe the two research questions and the underlying hypotheses. In 
my thesis I define the long-window as the annual period from 9 months before to 3 months 
after the annual/quarterly earnings fiscal-period end, and the short-window as the three days 
around the annual/quarterly earnings report date from 1 day before to 1 day after. 
 
Table 1: First research question hypotheses; does EA convey valuable information 
Table 1 presents the first research question; does EA convey valuable information and the underlying hypotheses  
 
            Hypothesis: Description 
H1 
EA is a significant explanatory factor for the contemporane-
ous returns in short/long-window measured with annu-
al/quarterly data 
The association between contemporane-
ous stock returns and EA 
H2 
 EA is a significant explanatory factor for the next period 
reported earnings measured with annual/quarterly data 
Whether the EA is informative in pre-
dicting future earnings 
H3 
EA is a significant explanatory factor for analyst 1- year earn-
ings per share (EPS) forecast revisions around earnings report 
dates measured with annual/quarterly data 
Whether the financial analysts use the 
EA information in revising their earn-
ings forecasts 
H4 
Both EA and analyst long-term EPS growth revision variables 
are significant explanatory factors for the contemporaneous 
returns in short/long-window measured with annual/quarterly 
data. 
Whether the EA conveys incremental 
information to that provided by changes 
in analysts’ forecasts of long-term 
growth 
 
  
 4 
 
Table 2: Second research question hypotheses; what drives EA information value 
Table 2 presents the second research question; what drives EA information value, and the underlying hypotheses 
 
           Hypothesis: Description 
H5 
EA from the cash flow component of earnings is more sig-
nificant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous returns 
in short/long-window than EA from the accruals component 
of earnings, measured with annual/quarterly data 
Whether the EA information derives 
from cash rather than from accruals or 
both components of earnings 
H6a 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the con-
temporaneous returns in short/long-window for both large 
and middle cap companies measured with annual/quarterly 
data 
Whether the EA information value de-
pends on the firm size – for explaining 
stock returns 
H6b 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for explain-
ing next period reported earnings for both large and middle 
cap companies measured with annual/quarterly data 
Whether the EA information value de-
pends on the firm size – for explaining 
future earnings 
H6c 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for explain-
ing analyst 5-year earnings per share (EPS) growth rate 
forecast revisions for both large and middle cap companies 
measured with annual/quarterly data 
Whether the EA information value de-
pends on the firm size – for explaining 
analyst forecast revisions 
H7 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the con-
temporaneous returns in short/long-window before and after 
the year 2008 (financial crisis and the EU-implementation of 
the IFRS rules) measured with annual/quarterly data 
Whether the EA information value 
changes over time 
H8 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the quar-
terly and annual data analyses 
Whether the annual and quarterly EA 
convey similarly valuable information 
 
1.4 Main findings  
 
The overall findings of my study suggest that the EA conveys valuable information to the 
European investors, measured with both annual and quarterly earnings data. Moreover, my 
results are fairly similar to those of the U.S. study of Cao et al (2011). In more detail, I detect 
a strong positive connection between the annual returns and positive EA. A similar EA asso-
ciation also exists with future earnings and analyst forecast revisions, indicating that the EA 
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information is useful to and used by analysts. More specifically, the analysts seem to value 
mostly the information in the earnings growth reversals. However, the analyst forecast revi-
sions do not consume all the EA information, which can be seen from the fact that even when 
including the forecast revision variable in the regression equation, there still exist some in-
cremental information in the EA variables. Despite the highly significant results from the an-
nual returns, the short-window returns do not provide useful information due the data availa-
bility issues in the earnings report dates. 
My findings not only confirm that the EA information is valuable, but also show that the val-
ue derives from the operating cash flows and not from the earnings accruals. The overall re-
sults of the EA information also hold regardless of the company size, and seem to be rather 
constant over time. The quarterly and annual results are highly similar, with the main differ-
ences being mostly in the emphasis between different EA patterns. At some points, the quar-
terly and annual information seems to be complementary, judged by the fact that for example, 
the long-term forecast revisions with the annual earnings data show more extreme forecast 
adjustments, while the revisions based on the quarterly earnings data are generally smaller. 
 
1.5 Limitations of the study  
 
My study contributes to the EA literature, which is so far not very exhaustive. Hence, the ap-
proach is more exploratory than firmly based on theoretical frameworks, and due to the scar-
city of the prior literature the scope of my study is somewhat descriptive and only in the sec-
ond research question unravels the more fundamental core issues of where the information 
value derives from. The more practical limitations of the study associate strongly with the 
data availability issues for the reported quarterly data. With a large number of robustness 
checks I try to overcome some of the negative implications of the imperfect data sets, but nat-
urally the scalability of the inferences suffers from the fact that the databases and reporting 
standards differ between the countries.   
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1.6 Structure of the study  
 
In the introduction (Chapter 1) I present the academic and practical motivations for my study 
and the contribution to the literature. I also state my research questions and hypotheses and 
explain briefly my main findings and limitations to the study. In Chapter 2, I provide an in-
sight into the theoretical background of EA. In Chapter 3, I present the data; in Chapter 4, I 
explain the methodology, and in Chapter 5, I present the annual and quarterly results. Chapter 
6 presents how I control for the robustness of the results, and finally the Chapter 7 concludes 
the whole study. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
 
There is a fundamental difference in the stock price determination between the finance and 
accounting literature. While the accounting literature studies whether the accounting earnings 
process captures the factors that affect the security prices in the efficient market (Ball and 
Brown, 1968; Easton et al, 1992), the finance literature tries to explain the stock prices with 
economic fundamentals (Fama, 1990) and views the stock returns rational. The theoretical 
background for the EA literature builds on the traditional earnings-based equity valuation 
models of Gordon (1959) and Malkiel and Gragg (1970). These traditional models identify 
the change in earnings growth (EA), the change in the rate of returns, and the change in earn-
ings as the three fundamental variables explaining the stock price changes. A large body of 
accounting literature is written considering the change in expected earnings (see Kothari 
2001), and the same applies for the financial literature concerning the change in expected re-
turns (see Vuolteenaho 2002). However, the academic literature on the change in earnings 
growth (EA) is still relatively scarce with Cao et al. (2011) being one of the most important 
developers of this field of study. In the following sections, I briefly go through all these three 
variables explaining stock prices, and then focus more closely on the EA literature. 
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2.1 Earnings change literature  
 
The earnings change literature builds on the dividend discounting model of Williams (1938), 
which defines the share price as the present value of the expected future dividends discounted 
at their risk-adjusted expected rate of return. Gordon (1959) makes some simplified assump-
tions to the dividend process and the discount rate making him the first to present an elemen-
tary theory of the stock price variation explained by dividends and earnings. His work consol-
idates the literature of various cross-section studies attempting to detect attractive investment 
opportunities and to arrive at buy and sell recommendations. Gordon studies the three possi-
ble hypotheses of whether the investor is actually buying the dividends, the earnings, or both 
components, when acquiring a company stock. The performance of the model in explaining 
the price variation is far superior to the simple empirical approach, but has still considerably 
room for improvements. On the other hand, Malkiel and Cragg (1970) show in their study of 
year-end common stock prices from 1961 through 1965 that the ratios of market prices to 
earnings are related to such factors as earnings growth, dividend payout, and various proxy 
variables designed to measure the risk or the quality of the returns stream.  
The earnings capitalization model of Fama and Miller (1972) extends the Gordon growth 
model by writing future dividends as forecasted earnings and forecasted investments. Two 
main contributions of Fama and Miller are that the dividends are interesting as signals of fu-
ture investments, and that the growth depends not only on investments, but also on invest-
ments with a return that is higher than the return determined by the CAPM model.  
A second branch of the change in earnings literature builds on the earnings response coeffi-
cient research, which links earnings and security returns literatures by measuring the extent of 
security’s abnormal market return in response to the unexpected component of reported earn-
ings (Collins and Kothari, 1989). This research is contingent on the market efficiency, and has 
also received a fair amount of criticism in different papers (see for example Ahmed, 1994; 
Anthony and Ramesh, 1992; Ohlson, 1995; Watts, 1992; and Kormendi and Lipe, 1987). One 
important developer of the earnings change, as a determinant of the stock prices, literature is 
the returns-earnings model of Easton and Harris (1991), which focuses on the current earnings 
change, and has strongly affected the methodological fundamentals of my thesis. The main 
findings of Easton and Harris (1991) are threefold. Firstly, the financial analysts use financial 
statement information in generating and revising their earnings forecasts. Secondly, the 
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change in reported accounting earnings is a proxy for the change in expected earnings.  Final-
ly, their empirical evidence indicates that the earnings changes are positively associated with 
returns. As a summary, Easton and Harris show the connection between accounting earnings 
and security returns.  
However, there are two features of the returns-earnings model that need further discussing. 
Firstly, Beaver et al (1980) have documented the prices lead earnings –phenomenon, which 
means that the accounting earnings appear in the stock prices with a lag that depends on the 
accounting standards. Secondly, the transitory earnings, or, the one-time gains or losses are 
reported more quickly for the bad news than for the good news due to the information asym-
metry costs and the litigation threat, leading to the fact that the negative news are priced on a 
more timely basis than the positive news (Ball et al, 2000). The use of transitory earnings also 
enables the managerial earnings management in the form of choosing for example whether to 
take a big bath, and whether to keep high accruals (Healy, 1985). To sum up the earnings 
change literature, the core idea is that the stock prices can be explained by the changes in cur-
rent earnings. The two branches of this body of literature suggest on one hand that the stock 
price is the present value of the future dividend stream deriving from the future earnings, and 
on the other hand, the returns response coefficient research explains the stock price changes 
with the unexpected earnings information component. Generally these two approaches look at 
the same question from two different angles. 
 
2.2 Rate of return literature  
 
A notable recent study explaining stock returns with the changes in discount rate comes from 
Vuolteenaho (2002). He uses the vector autoregressive model (VAR)
4
 to decompose an indi-
vidual firm’s stock returns into components of changes in cash-flow expectations and changes 
                                                 
 
4
 Vector autoregression (VAR) is a statistical model that can be used to capture linear interdependencies 
among multiple time series. The model allows for more than one evolving variable, which are all treated sym-
metrically in a structural sense. Each variable has an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags and 
the lags of the other model variables. The popularity of the model is partly explained by the fact that VAR mod-
eling does not require as much knowledge about the forces influencing the variable; only a list of variables 
which can be hypothesized to affect each other intertemporally.  
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in discount rates. As shown by Campbell and Shiller (1988a), the stock return volatility must 
originate from volatile cash-flow and/or expected-return news. Vuolteenaho’s three main 
findings are that the stock-returns are mainly driven by the cash-flow news, and that for a typ-
ical stock, the variance of cash-flow news is more than twice that of the expected-return news. 
Secondly, the shocks affecting the expected returns and the cash flows are positively correlat-
ed for a typical small stock. Thirdly, the cash-flow news is more easily diversified away in a 
portfolio than the expected-return news. This finding suggests that the cash-flow information 
is largely firm specific and that the expected-return information is predominantly driven by 
the systematic, market wide components. Thus, the information about the future cash flows is 
a more dominant factor driving firm-level stock returns than the information about the dis-
count rate that describes the firm’s riskiness. 
Supporting Vuolteenaho’s findings that the variance decomposition differs by firm size, there 
is a lot of evidence of different firm-specific factors affecting the return-predictability pat-
terns. For example, Banz (1981) discovers the “size effect” according to which small firms 
earn higher average stock returns than large firms. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) detect the 
“long-term reversal” effect, where the past long-term losers outperform the past long-term 
winners. Contrarily to this “long-term reversal”, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) present the 
“momentum” phenomenon, where the past short-term winners outperform the past short-term 
losers. Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) discuss the “book-to-market” anomaly, where 
the high book-to-market firms earn higher average stock returns than the low book-to-market 
firms. Finally, the higher profitability firms earn higher returns than the lower-profitability 
firms based on Haugen and Baker (1996), and based on the “leverage effect” the high-
leverage firms have historically outperformed the low-leverage firms (Bhandari’s, 1988). 
Summarizing the above, several authors document different kinds of returns-anomalies, but 
their existence depends on different research settings, and therefore they cannot be formally 
approved. Most of these anomalies also challenge the efficient market hypothesis. 
Other research relating the rate of return to stock prices includes among others Campbell et al 
(2010), which states that the systematic risk of stocks with similar accounting characteristics 
is primarily driven by the systematic risk in their fundamentals. More specifically, the growth 
stocks are particularly sensitive to temporary movements in the equity risk premium, while 
the value stocks are particularly sensitive to the permanent movements in market-wide 
shocks.  Thus, the growth stocks are not merely glamour stocks whose systematic risk is pure-
ly driven by investor sentiment. Also, Chen and Zhao (2009) emphasize the understanding of 
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the relative importance of discount rate news and cash flow news driving the stock return var-
iation. Chen and Zhao argue against the commonly used method of estimating the discount 
rate news directly, and having the cash flow news as a residual, which might possibly lead to 
large misspecification errors. 
Campbell and Ammer (1993) research the movements in stock and bond returns by studying 
the underlying variables of short-term real interest rates, expected changes in dividends, infla-
tion and excess returns on stocks and bonds. They discover that the real interest rate changes 
have little impact on the stock and 10-year bond returns, although the real interest rates do 
affect the short-term nominal interest rates and the slopes of the bond term structure. To sum 
up, these findings are not in contradiction with the rate of return change literature, because the 
real rates determine at best the risk-free discount rate, on top of which the risk premiums are 
then added.  Also, somewhat contradicting results are presented by Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) who fail to find any support for the various measures of short-term discount rates ex-
plaining the stock prices.  
A totally new approach for this body of literature is presented by Shiller (2003) who questions 
the ability of efficient market theory to predict stock prices, and turns to the behavioral fi-
nance for new answers. Behavioral finance has a broader social science perspective by includ-
ing psychology and sociology aspects to the traditional finance theory.  The revolution of ra-
tional expectations reached its height of dominance around 1970s, and believed that the spec-
ulative asset prices always incorporate the best information about fundamental values and that 
the prices only change because of good sensible information. However, the rational expecta-
tions models could not explain among other things the pricing anomalies, which lead to the 
behavioral finance assumptions that the market participants or the individual investors do not 
always act rationally. Hence, the behavioral finance assumptions undermine the traditional 
models ability to predict stock prices by adding an additional “human judgment” variable into 
consideration. While the theoretical models of efficient markets illustrate and characterize the 
ideal world, they do not describe the actual markets in their pure form.  
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2.3 Earnings acceleration literature  
 
EA literature is still rather uncovered topic in the academia. The two major lines of study fo-
cus on either the expected EA, or on the stock-price reactions to earnings strings-analyses. 
Moreover, there are only a few studies that include the EA variable in a returns model. In this 
section I will briefly cover these topics starting from the expected change literature. 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) present an earnings-based price model that is the first to 
distinguish between the short-term and the long-term growth. The short-term earnings growth 
rate enters linearly into the price equation, while the long-term earnings growth enters non-
linearly through the valuation parameters. The price model explains stock returns as a linear 
function of the change in the expected short-term earnings growth rate. The model distin-
guishes itself from the standard (Gordon/Williams) text-book approaches, which fix the 
growth rate and the payout rate, by resting on more general principles such as dividend policy 
irrelevancy. A second key difference in the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model is that 
it inverts the valuation formula by showing how one expresses the cost-of-capital as a func-
tion of the forward-EPS to price ratio and the short-term and long-term measures of growth in 
the expected EPS. A central principle in this equity valuation focuses on firms’ near term ex-
pected EPS and its subsequent growth. Hence, making money in the stock market is reduced 
to the idea of buying future earnings as cheaply as possible for a given level of risk. As an 
equilibrium consequence, firms with large price to future-EPS ratio should have large growth 
in expected EPS. The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) approach can be useful in the re-
search that focuses on individual firms’ expected returns and risks. Penman (2005) also com-
pares the two models with a utilitarian conclusion that the choice between the competing 
models ultimately comes down to the fact of how useful they are for the practical task of 
evaluating investments. He also points out the need to track the book values, because besides 
adjusting the leverage, some earnings growth measures increase by reducing the book values. 
Correspondingly, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Zhang (2000) anticipate that the conserva-
tive accounting of book values anticipates earnings growth. 
Chen and Zhang (2007) is one of the few papers that present in their returns model the signif-
icance of expected change in growth opportunities, as one of the accounting variables explain-
ing cross-sectional stock returns. Compared to the finance literature models that are based on 
common risk factors, this accounting-based model holds greater promise in explaining cross-
 12 
 
sectional price movements. The results suggest that it may be more fruitful for investors to 
search for information on the fundamental characteristics of firms’ operations than to exploit 
the common-factor-based anomalies. In the model of Chen and Zhang (2007), the earnings 
variable valuations are conditional on the level of profitability. Moreover, the future EA is 
proxied by the change in analysts’ consensus forecast of the firms’ long-term earnings growth 
rate. 
Next, I briefly introduce the two other studies that include EA in their returns models. Firstly, 
Aboody et al. (2004) investigate the relation between the share price and the stock-based 
compensation expenses that are disclosed, but not recognized, in the net income. They use an 
instrumental variables approach that includes the forecasted EA as a control variable. Second-
ly, Copeland et al (2004) find that the shareholder returns in current year are primarily related 
to the expectations about the long-term performance, which are measured with expected earn-
ings growth, and the EA as a control variable. Overall, there are not many studies that meas-
ure EA, and the few examples that exist have EA only as a control variable and as a proxy for 
expected, and not current, EA.  
The only study that utilizes historical accounting numbers in the valuation is the one of Cao et 
al (2011), whose methods I largely extend in my own study. Cao et al. study whether the cur-
rent EA measures convey value to stock returns and future earnings, and whether the analysts 
use the EA information in revising their earnings forecasts. Cao et al find very strong evi-
dence for the EA information value. However, this study settles with concluding that the EA 
conveys valuable information in the U.S. without trying to explain what affects this infor-
mation. My own study extends this field by showing that the information is similarly valuable 
in Europe and that the value derives from the cash flows and not from the earnings accruals.  
To conclude, the academic literature on EA is relatively scarce, given that the EA is one of the 
three fundamental elements of the traditional earnings-based equity valuation models of Gor-
don (1959), and Malkiel and Gragg (1970). The concept of EA is, however, widely recog-
nized in the non-academic literature, and is discussed in several investment research publica-
tions. There is also a large body of literature concerning the earnings growth and expected 
earnings growth, which is, however, out the scope of my study (see for example Fama and 
French, 1995, 2000; DeAngelo and Skinner, 1996; Burgstahler et al., 1997 and many more).  
Finally, the most relevant recent EA study is written by Cao et al. (2011), to which I contrib-
ute in my own study. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Sample building 
 
The sample selection starts with the Thomson ONE tool for geographic company screening. 
My selection criteria includes all the large and middle cap stocks from the 16 European de-
veloped countries, which are Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Switzerland (CHE), Germany 
(DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom 
(GBR), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Por-
tugal (PRT), and Sweden (SWE). The original sample size contains 387 large cap stocks with 
current market cap greater or equal to USD 5 000 Mil and 1055 middle cap stocks. My sam-
ple period runs from the beginning of 1995 to the fiscal year-end 2012. The data availability 
especially in the early years of my sample is partially very scarce, especially for the middle 
cap companies, and for the variables such as analyst forecasts and earnings report dates. Also, 
the 2012 earnings are not yet reported for all of the companies during my data gathering peri-
od. Another issue is the dearth of quarterly data in the databases. I perform cross-checks be-
tween the Thomson and Worldscope data sources, but either the reporting requirements in 
different European countries differ, or the databases are otherwise imperfect, since the total 
annual sample is 19 051 and the quarterly sample only 23 596 observations for the same time 
period. The financial statement data comes from Worldscope and Reuters, which are operated 
through Thomson One, the pricing data comes from Datastream, and the analyst forecast data 
comes from I/B/E/S through Thomson One. A full list of the data items, their sources, and 
their existence is tabulated in the Appendix Table 18. A natural starting period for the empiri-
cal research is 1995, where theoretically more than half of the data points exist based on the 
Appendix Table 18. Naturally, the final sample is smaller since the observations of the differ-
ent variables need to be matched by company and by observation period. The building of the 
annual and quarterly samples requires combining information from several databases with the 
company fiscal-period-end date as the common ticker.  
I eliminate from my sample the firms with negative book value of equity and the observations 
without data available for total assets. The data availability varies highly between different 
variables as can be seen from the Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Percentage and number of observations for different variables 
This table shows the variables and their number of observations for both annual and quarterly samples. The per-
centage of total –column shows the number of observations of a variable benchmarked to the total sample size. 
Variable Annual data Quarterly data 
  Obs. % of total Obs. % of total 
Total assets 19 051 100% 23 596 100% 
EBIT 18 977 99% 22 003 93% 
Number of shares outstanding 18 344 96% 20 853 88% 
ROA 17 288 91% 20 769 88% 
Market value 17 090 90% 20 035 85% 
Operating cash flow 16 942 89% 19 432 82% 
Book-to-market 16 351 86% 19 653 83% 
Future earnings 16 044 84% 20 230 86% 
Change in earnings 15 371 81% 17 191 73% 
Change in lagged equity book value 15 085 79% 18 881 80% 
Earnings acceleration 15 035 79% 16 109 68% 
Long-window returns 14 636 77% 22 068 94% 
Change in dividends 12 331 65% 6 272 27% 
Short-window returns 4 060 21% 13 120 56% 
5Y EPS growth forecast revision 2 064 11% 7 141 30% 
1Y EPS forecast revision 1 246 7% 3 979 17% 
Total sample size 19 051 100% 23 596 100% 
 
For example, the financial statement information is relatively complete, but the reporting 
dates and the analyst forecasts are more deficient. For some of the analyses I also lose 1-year 
observations from the sample period beginning and from the end, due to the earnings predic-
tion test requirement for one-year-ahead data, and the lagged variable requirement for one-
year-before data. The observations with the stock price less than USD 2 are dropped.
5
  
Moreover, my data is winsorized at the top and the bottom 0,5% to control for data outliers.
6
 
After the data cleaning, my sample size is 19 051 observations for the annual, and 23 596 for 
the quarterly data, which I report in USD. 
                                                 
 
5
 My results are robust to alternative share price cut-off points such as USD 1, or 3. 
6
  Winsor takes the non-missing values of a variable x and generates a new variable y identical to x except 
that the x highest and x lowest values are replaced by the next value counting inwards from the extremes. This 
transformation is named after the biostatistician Charles P. Winsor (1895-1951). For more discussion and refer-
ences, see Barnett and Lewis (1994). My results are robust for alternative levels of winsor e.g. 1%, or 5%.In the 
Stata, the winsor command is written by Nicholas J. Cox, Durham University, U.K., n.j.cox@durham.ac.uk 
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3.2 Data limitations 
 
One limitation in evaluating the data robustness is choosing between the alternative sources of 
earnings report dates. For example, the data for EPS announcement dates is partially different 
from the data for EBIT reporting dates, cross-checked with the companies’ actual report dates 
found on their websites. Luckily, the data is mostly comparable, and I also perform the tests 
with alternative report dates with no major differences in the results. A greater problem with 
the report dates is the low total amount of data and the fact that some databases consider the 
period end date as the report date if the actual report date is missing. More specifically, these 
report date issues add noise to the forecast revision analyses, since the matching of the fore-
cast revisions data with the data for the earnings report dates further decreases the number of 
observations. These are the major explanations why the results for the short-window analyses 
are extremely vague. However, in the long horizon the minor differences between the exact 
dates are not an issue, and the results are checked for robustness with different sources for 
report dates and forecast revisions. Figure 1illustrates how the shortage of the early report 
dates makes the overall periodic observation distribution skewed for the quarterly data. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of annual distribution of quarterly and annual data 
 
Another limitation in the comparability of the quarterly data analyses is caused by the control 
variable, change in dividends. Normally, dividends are paid once a year, and therefore the 
databases usually report the dividends for only one of the four quarterly observations, reduc-
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ing my sample size remarkably. I attempt to overcome this issue with different adjustments, 
but there are significant downsides in each of the alternatives. Firstly, I consider using the 
same annual dividend for each of the four quarters, but this would cause the change in divi-
dends to be zero for three out of the four quarterly observations of the year. Secondly, I con-
sider distributing the dividends incrementally between the four quarters, but based on the div-
idend behavior literature of Miller and Modigliani (1961), and Jagannathan and Weisbach 
(2000), I conclude that the dividends do not correlate credibly with any given metrics, making 
any discretional assessments very dubious. This is why I decide to continue with the original 
quarterly sample and to accept a lower number of quarterly observations (6 272).  
 
3.3 Variable definitions  
 
The definition of the EA variable is based on the arguments of Chan et al. (2003, 2004), and 
Daniel and Titman (2006), who argue that calculating earnings growth on a per share basis 
accounts better for merger and acquisition effects. Moreover, Chan et al. (2003, 2004) deflate 
the change in earnings per share by total assets per share rather than by earnings per share at 
the beginning of the period in order to avoid possible negative denominators from negative 
earnings. The prior literature considers various alternative earnings measures, but based on 
my robustness checks and the results of Cao et al. (2011), the change in earning measure does 
not affect the main results. Hence, I follow the methods of Cao et al. (2011) and Sloan (1996) 
in defining the EA as the change in operating income before extraordinary items per share 
from t-1 to t, divided by total assets per share at t-1. As a formula, the earnings growth rate at 
t is calculated as: 
(1) 
           
   
       
  – (
     
         
      
              
         
                                
              
Where, OI is operating income, and shares are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. 
Consequently, the EA is defined as the per share change in earnings growth, EGt – EGt-1. In 
the next table, I present the definitions for other key variables of my study. 
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Table 4: Key variables and their definitions 
 
Symbol Name Definition 
EA Earnings acceleration 
EGt – EGt-1  
Change in earnings growth from t to t-1 
OI Operating income Income before extraordinary items 
RST Short-term return 
3-day buy-and-hold returns measured [-1;1] days around earnings 
report date 
RLT Long-term return 
Annual buy-and-hold returns measured from [-9;3] months around 
ﬁscal year-end 
MV Market value Number of common sharest * Stock closing price at fiscal year-endt 
E Earnings 
OIt / MVt-1 
Income divided by the market value at the beginning of the year 
∆E Change in earnings 
( OIt - OIt-1 )/ MVt-1   Change in income divided by the market value at 
the beginning of the year 
EG Earnings growth 
EGt = [OIt/Sharest - OIt-1/Sharest-1] / [Total Assetst-1/Sharest-1)]; ad-
justed for stock splits and stock dividends 
BM Book-to-market Equity book valuet / Market value of equity at fiscal year-endt 
ROA Return on assets 
OIt / Total Assetst-1 
Operating income divided by the assets at the beginning of the year 
∆D Change in dividends 
∆Dividendst / MVt-1 Change in dividends divided by the market value 
of equity at the beginning of the year  
FRY 
Analyst forecast  
revision 
Percentage 1-year EPS consensus forecast revision after the earnings 
announcement 
∆LTG 
Change in long-term growth 
forecast 
Revision to the consensus 5-year EPS growth rate forecast after the 
earnings announcement 
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4. Description of the methodology    
4.1 Theoretical background for the returns model 
 
My returns model is based on the equity valuation model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005), which is the first to distinguish between short-term and long-term future earnings 
growth. This model assumes the current firm value as the sum of the capitalized one-period-
ahead earnings and the capitalized future abnormal change in earnings, which is assumed to 
grow at the constant rate, µ-1:
7
  
 
Equation 2: Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model (2005) 
 
                                                
 
where, pt is the current stock price, Et+1 is one-period ahead earnings, Et+2 is two-period-ahead 
earnings, r is the cost of equity capital (constant), R is defined as 1+r, dt+1 is one-period-ahead 
dividends, and µ = 1 + long-term perpetual earnings growth rate (also constant). Short-term 
future earnings-growth is reflected in (Et+2 - Et+1), while the long-term future earnings growth 
is reflected in µ. The original Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model is then developed further by 
Ozair (2004) and Ohlson and Gao (2006), who add the assumption of clean surplus account-
ing, the presence of “other information”, and the linear information dynamics, resulting in the 
following model: 
(3) 
           
                  
 
where bt is the current book value of equity, stock price (Et
a
) is the current abnormal earnings, 
v1t captures the change in future expected abnormal earnings, v2t is the “other information” 
                                                 
 
7
 The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model in (1) becomes equivalent to the Gordon growth model when dt+1 
= Et+1 (i.e., when the dividend payout is 100%). Thus, the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model is less restrictive 
than the Gordon growth model. In addition, it satisﬁes the Modigliani-Miller dividend irrelevance property 
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beyond the basic accounting data, and β1, β2, and β3 are valuation parameters. Cao et al. (2011) 
develop the model further by taking the historical change from t-1 to t and applying the clean 
surplus relation of the change in equity book value, equaling the earnings deducted by divi-
dends
8
 (bt – bt-1 = Et – dt), which yields to the following price change model: 
 
Equation 4: Developed Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model (2005) 
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where the returns model is linear in the level of current earnings (Et), current earnings growth 
(∆Et), the change in future (t+2) earnings growth (∆Et+2 - ∆Et+1), the change in future earnings 
(∆Et+1), the lagged change in book value of equity (∆bt-1), the change in future dividends 
(∆dt+1), and the change in current other information (v2t – v2t-1). Theory predicts positive coef-
ficients on Et, ∆Et, (∆Et+2 - ∆Et+1), and ∆dt+1, and negative coefficients on ∆Et+1 and ∆bt-1 since 
they reflect the residual income components.
9
 
I follow the approach of Cao et al. (2011), which replaces the expected EA, (∆Et+2 - ∆Et+1) 
with current EA, (∆Et - ∆Et-1), and the future change in dividends, (∆dt+1) with the current 
change in dividends, ∆dt. Furthermore, Cao et al. (2011) replace the change in future earnings, 
∆Et+1 with the current book-to-market ratio BMt because the latter is a forward-looking varia-
ble, which should help reducing any coefficient biases from not including ∆Et+1. Finally, the 
effects of any omitted variables should be reflected in the regression intercept and error terms.  
Overall, this study is more exploratory than a set of formal hypotheses deriving from theory.  
 
                                                 
 
8
 The clean surplus relation assumes the change in book value of equity to equal the amount of retained 
earnings 
9
 Note that the coefﬁcient 1/µ*β2 on (∆Et+2 - ∆Et+1), is an increasing function of µ. This makes economic 
sense because it indicates that the higher the rate of growth, the more highly valued is EA (∆Et+2 - ∆Et+1). 
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4.2 Empirical methodology for the research questions 
 
My empirical analyses employ a large sample of large and middle cap firm observations, for 
which I calculate the EA in USD, and report the results on a per share basis. The robustness 
checks confirm that my main results hold also for alternative earnings measures. The research 
questions are approached with seven different regression types, which are then further divided 
into two sub-regressions to survey the same setting with different time windows. These two 
time horizons are the three-day short-window, with the cumulative raw returns centered on 
the earnings announcement date, and the annual long-window starting from 9 months before 
to 3 months after the fiscal-period end date. As a research method, I use the two-tailed OLS 
regression with Newey-West standard errors for coefficients. The error structure is assumed 
to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to some lag. 
 
4.2.1 Newey-West standard errors for OLS coefficients  
 
A Newey-West estimator is used in statistics and econometrics to provide an estimate of the 
covariance matrix in situations where the standard assumptions of regression analysis do not 
apply. The original authors are Whitney K. Newey and Kenneth D. West in 1987
10
, although 
other versions of the model have been developed thereafter. Newey-West estimator can be 
used to improve the OLS regression by correcting autocorrelation, which is the over-time de-
creasing error term correlation in the time series regression. 
Stata has a user-written command, newey2
11
, which is an extension of Stata's official Newey-
West estimator, which accepts panel, as well as time series data sets
12
. Due to the limitations 
in the data availability, I am effectively dealing with an unbalanced panel data, which is the 
                                                 
 
10
 See Whitney K. Newey and Kenneth D. West (1987). A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Hetero-
skedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica Vol.55, No.3 (May, 1987),  pp. 
703-708 
11
  The author of newey2 command for Stata: David Roodman, Center for Global Development, USA, 
droodman@cgdev.org 
12
 Description of newey2 features: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s428901.html, or by typing the 
command “help newey2” to Stata after installing the package 
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reason for using the newey2. If the lag is specified to zero, the variance estimates produced by 
newey2 equal the Huber-White robust variance estimates, which are also known as the “het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard error” estimates. My chosen regression method is the 
Newey-West estimator with the lag of 1, due to the literature evidence of earnings items’ per-
sistency over subsequent periods. For example, Richardson and Sloan find that the earnings 
persistence is correlated with the reliability of accruals, and Hanlon (2005) detects negative 
association between the earnings persistence and the difference between the book income and 
taxable income.  The evidence from earnings persistence suggests that the lag term should not 
be ignored.  
To check the overall robustness of my regression method, I test the results with different re-
gression models, including the Newey-West estimator with lags from 0 to 5. Moreover, the 
reported results with Newey-West zero lag and OLS regression with Huber-White standard 
errors
13
 are indeed exactly the same. Finally, the increase in the Newey-West lag-term has 
only minor effects in the regression t- and p-values, thus, not enough to affect the overall sig-
nificance of the results. Cao et al (2011) use the two-step Fama Macbeth (1973) procedure
14
 
in studying the information content of EA. In the first step, Fama Macbeth (1973) method 
performs cross-sectional regressions for each time period, and in the second step the final co-
efficient estimate is obtained as the average of the first step coefficient estimates. I also per-
form the Fama Macbeth (1973) regressions, but due to my survey period of 16 years being 
much shorter (1995-2012) than Cao’s U.S data (1966-2008) the standard errors are high and 
the t-values very low, as expected. Hence, with my sample, the Newey-West estimator yields 
significantly more accurate results than the Fama Macbeth (1973) model.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
13
 Huber-White standard errors can be achieved with vce(robust) command in Stata and the Fama Macbeth 
(1973) estimators with xtfmb command 
14
 Description of Fama MacBeth (1973) features in Stata: http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456786.html  
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4.2.2 Specific patterns of earnings growth  
 
The regression equations are divided into two sub-regressions, (a) and (b), to account for the 
specific patterns of earnings growth, instead of only differentiating between positive and neg-
ative EA. In the base case scenario (a), the EA variable is considered either positive (PEA) or 
negative (NEA). The modified regression type (b) differentiates between the six specific pat-
terns of earnings growth (EG), and hence leads into the following six different EA variables: 
 
Figure 2: Specific patterns of EA 
 
Partition Formula Description 
EA1 EGt   >  EGt-1  >  0 EG is more positive in t than in (t-1) 
EA2 EGt   > 0  >  EGt-1    EG reverts from negative in (t-1) to positive in t 
EA3 0  >  EGt   >  EGt-1   EG is less negative in t than in (t-1) 
EA4 0  <  EGt   <  EGt-1   EG is less positive in t than in (t-1) 
EA5 EGt   <  0  <  EGt-1   EG reverts from positive in (t-1) to negative in t 
EA6 EGt   <  EGt-1  <  0 EG is more negative in t than in (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first three EA partitions capture the increases, and the last three partitions capture the 
decreases in earnings growth rates. The partitions therefore differ in terms of both signs and 
relative magnitudes of earnings growth in t and t-1. Conclusively, in order to answer the two 
research questions I have seven different regression equations, which are then analyzed in two 
different time windows, whenever the dependent variable is contemporaneous returns. Addi-
tionally, the equations are also divided into two sub-equations (a) and (b), to account for the 
different patterns of EA. As a comparison, I also have a benchmark model for the regression 
equations which does not include EA variables. 
0%       Earnings 
growth 
EA2 
EA5 
EA3 
EA6 
EA1 
EA4 
Figure 3: Illustration of the six EA patterns 
 
 23 
 
Figure 4: Illustration how the research questions are divided into multiple regressions 
This figure shows for the two research questions how all hypotheses are analyzed with both quarterly and annual 
data, and in short-term and long-term window, whenever the dependent variable is the contemporaneous returns. 
 
 
4.3 Regression equations for the research questions  
 
When testing the hypotheses, the regression equations are estimated as the empirical analogs 
of the Equation 4: The developed Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model. All my research ques-
tions are answered with different adjustments to this same base-regression model as illustrated 
in Table 5: The summary of regression equations. The table lists all the regression equations 
for different hypotheses and identifies the variables that are common to all of the equations, 
and the variables that are specific for different hypotheses.  
In the first column, I list all the seven regression equations and for each hypothesis I show the 
benchmark model (BM), the model (1a) that identifies the positive and negative EA, and the 
model (1b) that differentiates the six different EA partitions. In the second column, I show the 
dependent variable for each of the equations, and in the next five columns, I show the com-
mon control variables for each of the equations (a0-a4). In the EA variables –column, I show 
which EA variable I use in each of the regressions (a5-a6), and in the following four columns I 
show the remaining common control variables (a7-a10). The final two columns show the equa-
tion specific variables (a10), and the error term. The equation specific items are marked with 
grey color in Table 5. In the following section I describe all the equations in more detail. 
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Table 5: Summary of all regression equations 
Equa-
tion 
Dependent  
variable 
Common control variables EA variables Common control variables Specific 
variables 
Er
ror  
BM = 
Bench
mark 
model 
R = returns 
E(t+1) = future 
earnings 
FRY = analyst 
forecast revision 
 
In-
ter-
cept 
Earn-
ings 
(a1) 
Nega-
tive 
Earn-
ings 
(a2) 
∆ in 
earn
ings 
(a3) 
Negative 
∆ in 
earnings 
(a4) 
a) Positive and negative EA (a5) 
b) 6 EA partitions (a6) 
∆ in 
lagged 
equity 
book 
value 
(a7) 
Negative ∆ 
in lagged 
equity 
book value 
(a8) 
∆ in 
div-
iden
ds 
(a9) 
Book
-to-
mar-
ket 
(a10) 
∆ in 
analyst 
long-
term EPS 
forecast 
(a11) 
 
BM1 Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et)  ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
1a Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEAt NEAt ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
1b Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)t] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
BM2 E(t+1) a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et)  ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
2a E(t+1) a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEAt NEAt ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
2b E(t+1) a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)t] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
BM3 FRYt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et)  ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
3a FRYt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEAt NEAt ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
3b FRYt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)t] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
BM4 Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et)  ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt ∆LTGt ut 
4a Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEAt NEAt ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt ∆LTGt ut 
4b Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)t] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt ∆LTGt ut 
BM5 Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) EAOCF/ACCRUALS,t ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
5a Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEAOCF/ACCRUALS,t NEAOCF/ACCRUALS,t ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
5b Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)OCF/ACCRUALSt] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
BM6 Rt / E(t+1) / ∆LTGt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) EALARGE/MIDDLE,t ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
6a1/2/3 Rt / E(t+1) / ∆LTGt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEALARGE/MIDDLE,t NEALARGE/MIDDLE,t ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
6b1/2/3 Rt / E(t+1) / ∆LTGt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)LARGE/MIDDLE,t] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
BM7 Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) EABEOFRE/AFTER,t ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
7a1 Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) PEABEFORE/AFTER,t NEABEFORE/AFTER,t ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
7b1 Rt a0 Et (D1*Et) ∆Et (D1*∆Et) [EA(k)BEFORE/AFTER,t] ∆Bt-1 (D3*∆Bt-1) ∆Dt BMt  ut 
Equation specific variables 
Common equation variables 
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For each firm, i:  
Rt    = stock return in period t 
Et    = earnings in period t 
∆Et    = change in earnings from t-1 to t 
PEAt     = set to EAt, when EAt is positive and 0 otherwise 
NEAt     = set to EAt, when EAt is negative and 0 otherwise 
∆Bt-1     = change in book value of equity from t-2 to t-1 
∆Dt     = change in dividends from t-1 to t 
BMt     = book-to-market ratio at t 
D1     = indicator 1, if earnings (Et) is negative, and 0 otherwise 
D2     = indicator 1, if change in earnings (∆Et) is negative, and 0 otherwise 
D3  = indicator 1, if negative lagged equity book value (∆Bi,t-1), 0 otherwise 
EA(k)  = k runs from 1 through 6, and identifies the EA partition. Each EA(k) 
takes the value of [EGt – EGt-1] for firms that belong to partition k, and 
0 otherwise  
Et+1    = earnings in t+1, i.e. future earnings 
FRYi,t  = forecast revision variable, which is determined as the mean (consen-
sus) analysts’ earnings forecast revision for a given firm for the year 
t+1, following the announcement of year t earnings 
∆LTGt  = change in the forecast of long-term (5y) EPS growth rate for year t+1 
before and after the earnings announcement dates for year t 
PEA/NEAOCF   = positive/negative earnings acceleration from operating cash flow  
PEA/NEAACCRUALS = positive/negative earnings acceleration from accruals 
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4.3.1 H1: What is the association between stock returns and EA?  
 
Models (1a) and (1b) extend the Easton and Harris’s (1991) contemporaneous returns-
earnings model by adding earnings acceleration (EA), change in book value of equity, ∆Bt-1, 
and book-to-market, BMt, variables into the equation. The models (1a) and (1b) differ only in 
the EA term; (1a) splits the EA term into positive and negative EA (PEAt and NEAt), and the 
(1b) splits the EA into six different partitions specified in Figure 2. Both returns models are 
estimated in the short- and long-window with both annual and quarterly data. The regression 
equation is described in Table 5: Summary of all regression equations.  
The indicator variables control for negative changes in the book value of equity, and for nega-
tive earnings levels and changes (Hayn, 1995). Based on prior literature, the theory indicates 
that the stock returns correlation, and thus the coefficient signs, should be positive for a1 
(earnings) and a3 (earnings change), and negative for a2 (negative earnings) and a4 (negative 
earnings change). The sign for positive EA should be positive (a5), and negative for negative 
EA (a6), and the lagged book value of equity, (a7) is expected to have a negative sign. Finally, 
the theory does not predict the signs for the negative change in lagged book value (a8), for the 
current change in dividends (a9), or for the book-to-market ratio (a10). 
The specific patterns of earnings growth can be differentially informative. The EA variable 
categorization into six partitions is done by comparing the earnings growth, EG, at year t to 
the earnings growth in the prior year (t-1) in the model (1b). The term EA(k) identifies the EA 
partition. Each EA(k) takes the value of [EGt–EGt-1] for firms that belong to the given parti-
tion k, and 0 otherwise. Hence, the sum of the six EA partitions equals the EA. The signs for 
the EA partition coefficients are expected to be positive for the positive EA partitions and 
negative for the negative partitions.  
 
4.3.2 H2: Is EA informative in predicting future earnings?  
 
 
Theoretically and intuitively, if the EA and its partitions are priced by investors, suggested by 
significant positive results from (1a) and (1b); they should also be relevant in predicting fu-
ture earnings. Prior literature of Fama and French (2000), and Sloan (1996) documents strong 
associations between future earnings and current earnings levels and changes. Cao et al. 
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(2011) also documents with U.S. data that the EA associates strongly with future earnings. I 
test the EA hypothesis with European data in two different time horizons with the models (2a) 
and (2b) described in Table 5: Summary of all regression equations. The dependent variable is 
the future earnings in t+1, (Et+1), and all the other variables are defined as in (1a) and (1b).  
Fama and French (2000) document different earnings reversals, when the earnings levels and 
changes are negative, which I control in my models (2a) and (2b). The inclusion of book-to-
market (BMt) variable is also consistent with Fama and French (2000), who find that this vari-
able correlates with future profitability. Considering the expected coefficient signs, I expect 
the earnings persistence coefficient (a1) to be positive but less than 1.0 (Sloan, 1996). The 
earnings change coefficient (a3) indicates the speed of earnings mean reversion as in Fama 
and French (2000), and I expect it to be negative and greater than -1.0. The theory does not 
predict signs for the change in lagged book value of equity (∆Bt-1) (a7), or for its negative 
dummy (a8). Nissim and Ziv (2001) document that dividend changes convey information 
about future earnings, which is why the predicted sign for (a9) is positive. Finally, Fama and 
French (2000) report a connection between future profitability and positive market-to-book 
ratio, indicating that the coefficient for the inverse book-to-market variable (BMt) should be 
negative (a10). The EA coefficients (a5) and (a6) are expected to be positive and expected to 
indicate the direction of the earnings growth.   
In general, the EA coefficients capture the effect of reinforcement or attenuation of the mean 
reversion in earnings, depending on the EA growth pattern. For example, if the change in 
earnings in two subsequent years is positive, and the change in earnings is higher in the latter 
period, this leads to positive EA term (PEA), signaling that the earnings reversion to mean is 
slower. Consequently, if the change in earnings in two subsequent periods is still positive, but 
if the earnings growth in the latter period is slower, leading to negative EA (NEA), it can be 
interpreted as the accelerated mean reversion of earnings, since the NEA indicates negative 
change in earnings growth. In brief, the mean reversion feature of EA can be summarized as 
follows; while the change in earnings, ∆Et, indicates the one-period firm performance, the 
change in earnings growth (EA) indicates the underlying growth pattern, which either rein-
forces or attenuates the given change in earnings.  
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4.3.3 H3: Do financial analysts use EA information to revise their forecasts?  
 
In the third regression type, I study the association between analysts’ earnings forecast revi-
sions and the EA in order to determine whether the EA is useful to, or used by, analysts in 
predicting future earnings. Intuitively, if the EA is priced (1a) and (1b), and it predicts future 
earnings (2a) and (2b), it would be natural that the analysts would include this information 
into their earnings forecast revisions. A large body of literature suggests that the financial 
analysts use financial statement information in generating and adjusting their earnings fore-
casts (Bradshaw et al. 2001; Kothari 2001). I follow the approach of Cao et al. (2011) in de-
termining whether the EA is used in the forecast revisions. The models (3a) and (3b) are de-
scribed in Table 5: Summary of all regression equations, where FRYi,t is the forecast revision 
variable, which is determined as the mean (consensus) analysts’ earnings forecast revision for 
a given firm for the year t+1, following the year t earnings announcement
15
. All the other var-
iables are defined as in (1a) and (1b). It is unclear, how the analysts simultaneously use the 
earnings information, which is why I follow Cao et al. (2011) and not predict the signs for the 
coefficients. The model (3b) takes into account the different earnings growth patterns as in 
(1a) and (1b).  
 
4.3.4 H4: Does EA convey incremental information to the changes in analysts’ long-
term earnings growth forecasts?  
 
In the fourth regression type I examine whether current EA is informative in the presence of 
forward-looking information. I follow the method of Chen and Zhang (2007), and Cao et al. 
(2011) and add the change in consensus analysts’ forecast of the firm’s long-term earnings 
growth rate, ΔLTG, to the regression equation (1a) and (1b). Since the variable ΔLTG indi-
cates the future expected earnings growth, and the EA measures the current change in earn-
ings growth, the variable ΔLTG can be used as a proxy of future EA, and to examine, whether 
                                                 
 
15
 The FRY variable is defined as the percentage revision of the mean earnings per share (EPS) consensus 
forecast around the earnings announcement date. The data comes from I/B/E/S. Cao et al. (2011) define the FRY 
as the forecast revision scaled by the absolute value of the latter forecast. Since the FRY is considered a percent-
age revision, I use the natural logarithm ln(FRY) in the regression equation and take into consideration the loga-
rithmic interpretation of the regression coefficients  
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the current EA coefficients are incrementally significant in explaining the future earnings 
growth. The ΔLTG16 is defined as the change in the consensus analysts’ forecast of the firm’s 
long-term earnings growth rate before and after the earnings announcement. Based on Chen 
and Zhang (2007), I expect the coefficient on ΔLTG (a11) to be positive.  
 
4.3.5 H5: Does EA information derive from cash or accruals or both components of 
earnings?  
 
The EA variable builds on the operating income, which is constructed of two different earn-
ings components. These components are operating cash flow and accruals, and the accruals
17
 
consist mostly of inventories, accounts receivable, and accounts payable. The distribution 
between cash and accruals has a strong explanatory power on earnings quality. For example, 
Sloan (1996) shows that the accruals component of earnings is less persistent than the cash 
flow component and attributes the difference to the greater subjectivity of accruals. Moreover, 
Xie (2001) shows that earnings’ persistence differs between discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals, and therefore finds evidence for the earnings subjectivity. However, 
slightly contradicting, Dechow (1994), and Dechow et al. (1998) report that the earnings ac-
cruals are more relevant in reflecting the firm performance than the cash flows. Hence, irre-
spective of the different suggested outcomes, the literature provides evidence that the division 
between cash and accruals can provide meaningful results. The cash versus accruals question 
also provides insights into the company cash cycle (see for example Dechow et al. 1995), and 
even into the earnings management (see for example Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  Overall, a 
large body of literature discusses the earnings relation between accruals and cash flow. For 
example, Healy (1985) defines discretionary accruals as adjustments to the cash flows select-
ed by managers in order to affect reported net income. In the studies of Healy (1985), Dechow 
(1994), and Sloan (1996), the accounting accruals are generally described as the product of 
accounting entries and management estimations that have no cash flow effects. Their basic 
                                                 
 
16
 The ΔLTG variable is defined as the change in the consensus forecast of long-term (5y) EPS growth  rate 
before and after the earnings announcement dates 
17
 Accruals refer to accounts on a balance sheet that represent liabilities and non-cash-based assets used in 
accrual-based accounting. These types of accounts include, among others, accounts payable, accounts receivable, 
inventories, goodwill, deferred tax liability and future interest expenses 
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characteristic is that they sum to zero over time and are therefore both more predictable and 
less persistent than the cash flow components of earnings. To my knowledge, besides my 
study, there is no relevant prior research of cash flows and accruals explaining the EA infor-
mation. I start by defining these two earnings components.
18
  
(5) 
Operating cash flow (OCF) = EBIT – Change in inventory + Change in deferred revenues + 
Non-Cash Items  
(6) 
Net operating accruals (NOA) = EBIT – Operating cash flow (OCF)  
 
There are some arguments why operating cash flow is a better measure of firm revenue than 
operating income. Cash flow is harder to manipulate under GAAP (Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles), and the cash flow captures the changes in working capital. Operating 
cash flow shows how the cash is generated during the period, and it shows the translation pro-
cess from accrual accounting to cash accounting. The key differences between the accrual and 
cash accounting are demonstrated in the cash cycle concept, which is the process of convert-
ing sales into cash flows via inventories and accounts receivables. There are many ways that 
cash can get trapped on the balance sheet and many opportunities for managerial discretion. 
The two most common ways for how the cash can be cumulating on the balance sheet are 
customers delaying payments (build up of receivables), and rising inventory levels. The com-
parison between operating cash flow and net income reveals the problems in the cash cycle 
(Jones, 1991; Dechow et al. 1995), making the operating cash flow a more reliable source of 
the real income effects. There are also ways for companies to temporarily boost their cash 
flows for example by delaying payments to suppliers (extending payables), selling securities, 
and reversing charges made in prior quarters. Whether these kinds of decisions reflect discre-
tional management of cash figures or are simply parts of the company financing strategy, de-
                                                 
 
18
 This division of earnings components builds on accruals definitions by Healy (1985), Sloan (1996) and 
the FASB definition of Financial Accounting Standards Number 95 “Statement of Cash Flows”  
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pend on the managerial motives. In my approach, I study how these two components explain 
EA by dividing the variable into EA from operating cash flow (OCF) and EA from accruals. 
(7) 
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This decomposition of earnings growth leads to two corresponding EA variables: 
(9) 
                            
(10) 
                                          
 
Hence, I adjust the regression type (1a) and (1b), and create three equations for both EAOCF 
and EAACCRUALS to study their information effects. To the benchmark model (BM5) I add the 
EAOCF or EAACCRUALS variables, and all the regressions are analyzed in both short- and long-
windows when applicable. Originally, I considered regressing the EAOCF and EAACCRUALS in 
the same regression equation, but since the variables are highly correlated, the results suffer 
from extreme levels of multicollinearity
19
, which is why I must regress EAOCF and EAACCRU-
ALS separately. The regression equation (5a) differentiates between the positive and negative 
EA of the cash flow and accruals components similarly than in regression (1a), where, 
PEAOCF/ACCRUALS corresponds to the PEA, and the NEAOCF/ACCRUALS corresponds to the NEA. 
The third regression equation (5b) differentiates between the six different EA partitions for 
the cash flow and accruals components. 
                                                 
 
19
 The Pearson correlation coefficient between EAOCF and EAACCRUALS is -0.7484, which is why I regress 
the variables separately. There exists a trade-off between the costs omitting the other explanatory variable and 
the cost of increased multicollinearity. 
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Considering the earnings quality, higher significances for the EAOCF coefficients would be 
more desirable than for the EAACCRUALS coefficients. This would indicate that the market can 
distinguish the EA that derives from the real operations and is not fooled by the changes in 
the discretional accrual elements. My results contribute to the wide literature of accruals 
anomaly from the EA perspective. Sloan (1996) is the first to document that the stocks of 
companies with low accruals outperform the companies with high accruals, if the stocks are 
held for a one year period. This happens because the accruals are less persistent and lead to 
negative future abnormal stock returns. Sloan also concludes that the investors do not fully 
comprehend the greater subjectivity involved in the estimation of accruals. Hence, by show-
ing that the EA information derives from the cash element and not from the accruals, I show 
that the accruals anomaly does not apply to the EA information value. Overall, the question of 
earnings management is widely documented in the literature. Examples of the studies consid-
ering the earnings management include for example Jones (1991), De Fond and Park (1997), 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), Cohen et al. (2007), Zhang (2005), and Jiambalvo (1996). Howev-
er, after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), the trend has been increasingly shifting from earn-
ings management to expectations management (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). 
 
4.3.6 H6: Does EA information differ between the large and middle cap firms?  
 
My data set comprises of the European developed countries’ large and middle cap firms. The 
general intuition suggests that the large companies have higher analyst following, more media 
attention, and larger investor bases than the smaller companies. The literature starts by stating 
that ceteris paribus, stocks with lower analyst coverage should be the ones with slower 
movement of firm-specific information across the investment public (Hong et al. 2000). The 
caveat is that the analyst coverage is very strongly correlated with the firm size (Bhushan, 
1989), and the lower analyst coverage has been used as an explanation for the inverse relation 
between the information content and the firm size (Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987; and Bhu-
shan, 1989). Following this logic, the literature argues that larger firms are followed by more 
analysts, which results in more private information available, which in turn leads to superior 
forecasting accuracy over time and the earnings announcements for these firms being less 
informative, due to smaller surprise elements. Hence, I study the effect of the company size 
on the EA information value. The initial assumption is that since the large cap firms are more 
 33 
 
thoroughly followed and analyzed than the middle cap firms, the EA coefficients should also 
be more significant for them. The empirical methodology is exactly the same as in H5, with 
the exception that the EAOCF is replaced with EAMIDDLE and the EAACCRUALS is replaced with 
EALARGE. The sample is divided into large and middle cap firms based on the Thomson One 
Banker’s categorization, with the category cut-off point being USD 5 000 Million. 
 
4.3.7 H7: Does EA information differ over time?  
 
To better understand what determines the EA information value, it can be lucrative to study 
whether this information changes over time. Possible determinants that may cause changes 
during my sample period are major regulatory changes (European IFRS implementation in 
2008
20
), or macroeconomic effects (2008 financial crisis). Hence, I divide my sample into 
pre- and post-2008 to study the possible changes in the EA information. Again, my approach 
is exactly the same as in H5, and I compare the subsamples of pre- and post-2008.  
Possible differences between the two samples would indicate that the earnings reporting is 
changing either towards positive or normative direction. The normative accounting of early 
capital markets research (e.g. Hendriksen, 1965) was the leading theory until mid-1960s, 
doubting the usefulness of the historical cost accounting in assessing the firm’s financial 
health. The reasoning behind is that the normative accounting practices are designed to serve 
the assumed set of accounting objectives, instead of explaining stock price reactions. A more 
recent critique for the usefulness of the earnings information is presented by Lev (1989), who 
explains the weak returns-earnings correlation with reported earnings’ low quality, caused by 
biases in accounting measurement, valuation principles, and managerial data manipulation. 
The change into positive accounting research (Ball and Brown, 1968) is boosted in the 1960s 
by the development of the Keynesian positive economic theory, the efficient market hypothe-
                                                 
 
20
 For example Daske (2006) states that the benefit of IFRS adoption to some jurisdictions is that financial 
reporting becomes more transparent, with additional disclosure requirements and rules that impact the quality of 
accounting numbers. Moreover, Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008 find that firms adopting IFRS engage in less 
earnings management and exhibit more timely loss recognition, which the authors interprets as evidence of high-
er financial reporting quality. However, Brown (2011) shows that IFRS adoption European effects are far from 
uniform, and finally Ahmed et al. (2012) finds that IFRS is not associated with discretionary accruals, which is a 
construct for earnings management 
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sis, the capital asset pricing models (Fama, 1965; Sharpe, 1964, and Lintner, 1965), and the 
event study of Fama et al. (1969). The pioneers of this new positive accounting research of 
“explain and predict” are Ball and Brown (1968), Beaver (1968), and Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986), who believe the investors may find valuable pricing information in the accounting 
figures. Also, Cao et al. (2011) report a strong correlation between the EA and stock returns, 
which is why I hypothesize that if there is a change in the EA information, it should be to-
wards the positive accounting theory. 
 
4.4 Empirical methodology to study quarterly EA  
 
In the variables section, I define the EA as the change in earnings growth per share,         
           and the earnings growth as                 ⁄   – (               ⁄     
                          ⁄  , where OI is operating income after depreciation and the shares 
are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. When addressing the two research questions, 
the focus is on the annual EA and on the annual figures. I extend the literature by examining 
whether the results are affected when the EA is calculated as a change in quarterly earnings 
growth.            . I also consider all the other variables on a quarterly basis to main-
tain the comparability of the results. As a summary, I perform all the regressions with both 
annual and quarterly data samples.  
 
4.5 Univariate analyses 
4.5.1 Univariate analyses for annual data 
 
In Table 6, I present the descriptive statistics for the annual sample and for the six EA parti-
tions. I report the averages of the yearly values from 1995 to 2012, with all the statistics based 
on non-zero EAs in each EA partition. Panel A reports distributional statistics for the EA and 
its six partitions EA1-EA6. The distribution is overall rather symmetric, but there are on aver-
age three times as many observations in the two reverting EA partitions; EA2 (revert to posi-
tive) and EA5 (revert to negative). Altogether these two partitions cover 66% of the total 
number of annual 15 035 EA observations, and Cao et al. (2011) report a similar high concen-
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tration of reverting earnings. The financial crisis of 2008 may be one explanatory factor, why 
the smallest number of observations is in partition EA1 (more positive). The partitions EA3 
(less negative) and EA6 (more negative) contain each less than 10% of the observations. In 
total, roughly half of the observations experience negative EA. 
Panel B presents the means, medians, and the standard deviations of firm characteristics for 
the full sample and for the six EA partitions. There are large standard deviations indicating 
substantial variability around the mean of each firm characteristic. The standard deviations 
between different earnings partitions remain relatively constant with the exception of EA1 
(more positive) having higher standard deviations for the earnings related variables. The 
means remain relatively constant, except for the opposite extremes of EA1 (more positive) 
and EA6 (more negative). Logically, also the book-to-market ratio is greater than 1 for the 
negative EA partitions and below 1 for the positive EA partitions. Except for the change in 
dividends, all the variables are highly and positively skewed. This can be interpreted from the 
fact that the means are almost twice the amount of medians for most of the variables. The 
mean (17.9%) and the median (11.5%) contemporaneous annual long-term returns (LT-
RETURN) measured from 9 months before to 3 months after fiscal year-end for the full EA 
sample are significantly positive. Evidently, there is a positive association between EA and 
current long-term returns. The partitions with positive EA and positive earnings growth, EA1 
(more positive) and EA2 (revert to positive) show high and positive mean returns, (35.5% and 
25.9%), while the partitions with negative EA and negative earnings growth, EA5 (revert to 
negative) and EA6 (more negative) show lower than average and even negative mean returns 
(10.9% and -3.0%). The partitions EA3 (less negative) and EA4 (less positive) are the most 
difficult to interpret. For the long-term returns, the initial benchmark still affects strongly, 
making the EA3 (less negative) have low returns (9.5%), and the EA4 (less positive) have 
high returns (27.2%). The general interpretation based on the high amount (66%) of reverting 
EA observations is that one-period change in earnings growth, EA3 (less negative) and EA4 
(less positive) does not affect the long-term returns significantly, but if the pattern continues, 
EA1 (more positive) and EA6 (more negative), the effects on long-term returns are higher. 
However, for the short-term returns, the average return is practically 0%, and there are no real 
deviations between the partitions. The lack of short-window returns can be mostly explained 
by the lacking reporting dates in my sample. 
Cao et al. (2011) detect clustering in the company market values between the partitions. The 
largest firms belong to the EA1 (more positive) and the smallest firms to the EA6 (more nega-
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tive) suggesting that the large firms would create larger long-term returns. However, my data 
does not show any significant differences between the company sizes in different partitions. 
All in all, the healthiest companies can be found in the EA1 (more positive), with higher earn-
ings growth (7.1%), higher future profitability, ROAT+1, (9.7%) and lower book-to-market 
ratio (0.70) than in the other partitions.  
Panel C reports Pearson correlations between key variables and EA partitions. Most of the 
correlations are significant and suggest that overall the EA may be informative. EA correlates 
strongly with most of the long-term returns partitions, suggesting that the EA conveys infor-
mation to investors. Moreover, the correlation is significant and positive for the positive parti-
tions EA1 (more positive), and EA2 (revert to positive). The partitions EA3 (less negative) 
and EA5 (revert to negative) coefficients do not differ significantly from 0, and the negative 
partitions EA4 (less positive) and EA6 (more negative) have also significant positive correla-
tions. The positive correlations between EA partitions and earnings and change in earnings 
are highly expected, since all these variables derive from earnings. The strong correlations 
between ROA1+T and EA indicate that the EA may predict future earnings, which in turn may 
explain the correlation between EA and the long-term returns. Overall the results are very 
similar to those of Cao et al. (2011), and the correlations predict that EA may be informative. 
Next, I present a similar univariate analysis for the quarterly data. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics and correlations for annual data 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients for the annual data sample. The 
sample consists of 19 051 firm-year observations from 1995 to 2012. The variables are defined in the Table 4 
and the EA partitions in the Figure 3. The EA partition statistics reported in Panels A-C are based on non-zero 
EAs in each partition. For example the mean of EA2 is based on 4 522 observations. All variables are winsorized 
at the top and the bottom 0.5% to control for outliers. ***, **, and * indicate significances at 1, 5, and 10% lev-
els based on two-tailed t-tests. The t statistics are based on the means and standard errors of the yearly values as 
in Newey-West (1987), and they are adjusted for serial correlation. 
  EA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
Panel A: Distribution of earnings acceleration 
     N 15 035 1 007 4 522 1 176 1 678 5 360 1 292 
N% 100% 7% 30% 8% 11% 36% 9% 
Mean (0.002) 0.071 0.080 (0.026) 0.034 (0.077) (0.057) 
Standard deviation 0.132 0.130 0.151 0.049 0.066 0.144 0.080 
Minimum (0.691) 0.000 0.000 (0.360) 0.000 (1.098) (0.586) 
Q1 (0.027) 0.010 0.010 (0.025) 0.003 (0.076) (0.068) 
Median (0.001) 0.028 0.029 (0.009) 0.010 (0.028) (0.033) 
Q3 0.022 0.068 0.083 (0.003) 0.033 (0.009) (0.013) 
Max 0.750 0.896 1.191 (0.000) 0.499 (0.000) (0.001) 
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        Panel B Variable distribution EA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
ST-RETURN, 4 060 250 1 180 351 309 1 341 382 
Mean 0.002 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
Median 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.000 
Std 0.060 0.056 0.056 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.067 
LT-RETURN 
       N 14 636 850 3 787 995 1 334 4 414 1 074 
Mean 0.179 0.355 0.259 0.095 0.272 0.109 (0.030) 
Median 0.115 0.262 0.176 0.026 0.178 0.057 (0.082) 
Std 0.523 0.554 0.548 0.552 0.521 0.483 0.505 
MARKET VALUE. (M$) 
       N 14 583 985 4 427 1 156 1 572 5 177 1 266 
Mean 7040 7700 7130 7500 6540 6920 6980 
Median 1570 1730 1600 1550 1370 1580 1580 
Std 16700 17900 16800 17500 16700 16300 16100 
EARNINGS 
       N 14 386 979 4 381 1 147 1 533 5 092 1 254 
Mean 0.091 0.150 0.106 0.052 0.119 0.083 0.027 
Median 0.072 0.098 0.079 0.060 0.087 0.069 0.047 
Std 0.173 0.226 0.195 0.171 0.154 0.151 0.160 
CHANGE IN EARNINGS 
       N 14 386 979 4 381 1 147 1 533 5 092 1 254 
Mean 0.019 0.133 0.090 (0.055) 0.061 (0.029) (0.078) 
Median 0.009 0.043 0.025 (0.009) 0.029 (0.002) (0.027) 
Std 0.171 0.287 0.289 0.147 0.107 0.127 0.158 
EARNINGS GROWTH 
       N 15 035 1 007 4 522 1 176 1 678 5 360 1 292 
Mean 0.011 0.071 0.042 (0.026) 0.038 (0.015) (0.039) 
Median 0.004 0.030 0.015 (0.006) 0.020 (0.001) (0.018) 
Std 0.080 0.124 0.098 0.063 0.059 0.063 0.070 
BOOK-TO-MARKET 
       N 14 583 985 4 427 1 156 1 572 5 177 1 266 
Mean 0.790 0.702 0.774 0.848 0.753 0.796 0.882 
Median 0.561 0.538 0.561 0.586 0.546 0.561 0.589 
Std 1.015 0.785 0.959 1.258 0.926 1.046 1.172 
ROA (T+1) 
       N 16 374 952 4 232 1 014 1 587 4 838 1 160 
Mean 0.071 0.097 0.074 0.063 0.084 0.067 0.059 
Median 0.049 0.062 0.054 0.046 0.057 0.048 0.040 
Std 0.120 0.132 0.112 0.106 0.119 0.113 0.108 
CHANGE IN DIVIDENDS 
       N 12 331 789 3 596 962 1 191 4 091 1 072 
Mean (0.002) (0.004) 0.004 0.003 (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) 
Median (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Std 0.030 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.022 0.026 0.030 
        Panel C: Pearson correlations 
        EA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
ST-RETURN 0.012 (0.115)* (0.026) 0.032 0.056 0.011 0.080 
LT-RETURN 0.145*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.046 0.080*** (0.010) 0.087*** 
MARKET VALUE. (M$) 0.004 (0.088)*** (0.070)*** 0.101*** (0.054)** 0.069*** 0.098*** 
EARNINGS 0.178*** 0.327*** 0.205*** 0.237*** 0.058** 0.053*** 0.287*** 
CHANGE IN EARNINGS 0.569*** 0.664*** 0.606*** 0.491*** 0.481*** 0.378*** 0.433*** 
EARNINGS GROWTH 0.760*** 0.937*** 0.853*** 0.795*** 0.737*** 0.539*** 0.766*** 
BOOK-TO-MARKET (0.012) 0.005 (0.003) (0.065)** (0.040) 0.002 0.041 
ROA (T+1) 0.070*** 0.171*** 0.164*** 0.087*** 0.193*** (0.074)*** (0.133)*** 
CHG IN DIVIDENDS 0.079*** (0.009) 0.085*** (0.040) (0.012) 0.003 0.024 
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4.5.2 Univariate analyses for quarterly data  
 
In the Appendix Table 21,Table 6: Descriptive statistics and correlations for annual data I 
present the descriptive statistics for the quarterly sample and for the six EA partitions similar-
ly to the annual sample in Table 6. Panel A reports distributional statistics for the EA and its 
six partitions. The distribution is again very symmetric with the same clustering of observa-
tions in the two reverting EA partitions, EA2 (revert to positive) with 34% of observations, 
and EA5 (revert to negative) with 37% of observations. The slightly increased percentages in 
these two partitions can be explained by the quarterly data being highly skewed to the right 
(see Figure 1) and not representing the sample period with equal weights than the annual data. 
The total number of quarterly EA observations is 23 596, compared to the annual number of 
19 051. Overall, the quarterly EA distribution is fairly similar to the annual distribution. 
Panel B presents the means, medians, and the standard deviations of the firm characteristics to 
the quarterly data. The quarterly standard errors are similarly skewed as in the annual data, 
but the differences between the means across the partitions are slightly smaller. It is notewor-
thy that the long-term mean returns and standard deviations are roughly similar for all the 
partitions suggesting that the connection between the EA and the stock returns is not especial-
ly strong in the quarterly window. This interpretation is also supported by the non-significant 
Pearson correlation coefficients in Panel C for the long-term and short-term stock returns. To 
conclude, the results of the quarterly descriptive analysis are in line with those of the annual 
with the exception that there is no significant correlation between the long-term returns and 
the EA in the quarterly data. Otherwise, the results are in general comparable and support the 
hypothesis that the EA may convey valuable information to investors. In the next section, I 
continue with the results for the multiple regression analyses. 
5. Analysis and results  
 
After describing the sample characteristics, I present the results for my multiple regression 
analyses. I start with the first research question and show that the EA conveys valuable infor-
mation to the investors in the European markets, and then continue to the second research 
question and explain what drives this information. I perform all my tests with both annual and 
quarterly data.  
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5.1 Empirical results of EA conveying valuable information with European data 
5.1.1 Association between contemporaneous stock returns and EA (H1) 
 
Table 7 reports the results for the long-window contemporaneous returns model (1a) and (1b) 
using the annual buy and hold returns accumulated from 9 months before to 3 months after 
the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year-end. Overall, my results are mostly in line with the prior literature of 
Cao et al. (2011). Column 1 presents the results for the benchmark model that does not in-
clude EA variables. More specifically, the earnings coefficient is positive and highly signifi-
cant in 1% level, and the incremental coefficient for negative earnings is negative and highly 
significant. However, unlike Cao et al. (2011), I do not find significant results for the earnings 
change, or for the negative earnings change. Column 2 reports results for model (1a). I find 
highly significant negative coefficient for the negative earnings change, and the coefficients 
for earnings and negative earnings are significant. Furthermore, the coefficient on positive EA 
(PEA) is negative (-0.344) and significant in 5% level, and the negative EA (NEA) coefficient 
is positive (0.861) and highly significant in 1% level. However, the negative coefficient for 
the positive EA is somewhat counter-intuitive. Column 3 reports the results for estimating 
model (1b). The coefficients for earnings, negative earnings, and negative earnings change are 
highly significant, and their signs are as predicted. Most of the EA partitions are also positive 
and highly significant. Specifically, the partitions EA3 (less negative), EA5, (revert to nega-
tive), and EA6 (more negative) have highly significant (1% level) positive coefficients. The 
coefficient for EA1 (more positive) is positive and significant in 10% level, and the coeffi-
cient for EA2 (revert to positive) has a slightly negative coefficient (-0.258) in the 10% level. 
The insignificance of EA4 can result from the noise in the annual data, but also from the na-
ture of the information conveyed by EA4 (less positive). The information may be transitory 
and fully valued already in the short-window, having no longer information value in the long-
window. Another unexplored possibility is that the stocks might be mispriced, but this ques-
tion is beyond the scope of my study.
21
 All the four control variables (change in lagged equity 
book value, change in dividends, negative change in lagged equity book value, and book-to-
market) are highly significant with the two latter having negative coefficients. Finally, the 
                                                 
 
21
 See for example Vermaelen (1981), Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994), and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) for more discussion on the stock mispricing 
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adjusted R
2
 in model (1b) increases to 17.0% from the 15.5% in the benchmark model with 
the number of observations in models (1a) and (1b) being 9 943. 
Panel B supplements the Panel A statistical significances with the economic significances. 
The association between the change in annual returns and the change in EA is calculated by 
multiplying the EA coefficients with the standard deviations of the earnings variables. Col-
umn 3 indicates that one standard deviation change in EA1 through EA6 relates to the chang-
es in respective returns of 13.0; -3.9; 11.7; 3.4; 11.5; and 21.1%. For a comparison, one stand-
ard deviation change in earnings level is associated with a change in returns of 20.3%, sug-
gesting that the economic impact of EA is comparable to the impact of changes in earnings 
levels. 
Panel C tests, whether the different EA partitions are significantly different from each other, 
by pair wise comparing their annual returns regression (1b) coefficients with the bootstrap-
ping method
22
. This comparison adds value, because the existing EA theory suggests only one 
positive valuation coefficient for EA (e.g. Chen and Zhang, 2007; and Easton and Harris, 
1991), but following the method of Cao et al. (2011), I have six different coefficients. The 
results from Panel C show that the different EA partition coefficients are significantly differ-
ent from each other in 11 pairs out of 15, supporting the view that the market views and prices 
the various EA patterns differently. The largest coefficients are for EA3 (revert to positive) 
and for EA6 (more negative), indicating that the investors view the pattern EA3 (less nega-
tive) as the most favorable and the EA6 (more negative) as the least favorable. Cao et al. 
(2011) find similar results with the highest coefficients in partitions EA1 and EA6. Conclu-
sively, I consider the long-window results in Table 7 as strong evidence that current EA con-
veys value relevant information to investors with a significant economic impact, and which is 
incremental to that of earnings levels and changes. The results are in line with the findings of 
Cao et al. (2011) supporting strongly the hypothesis H1 stating that with annual long-window 
data the EA is a significant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous returns. Next, I briefly 
analyze the results of the same regressions with the short-window, and with the quarterly data. 
                                                 
 
22
 See Mooney, C. Z., and R. D. Duval. 1993.  Bootstrapping: A Nonparametric Approach to Statistical In-
ference.  Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
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Table 7: Regressions of contemporaneous annual raw returns on EA 
This table presents the regression results of annual buy-and-hold returns for ﬁrm i over the period 9 months be-
fore to 3 months after the ﬁrm’s t ﬁscal year end. The results are obtained from 19 051 ﬁrm-year observations. 
Ri.t = annual buy-and-hold return for ﬁrm i over the period 9 months before to 3 months after the ﬁrm’s t ﬁscal 
year end. PEAi.t is set to EAi.t when EAi.t is greater than (or equal to) 0, and 0 otherwise; NEAi.t is set to EAi.t 
when EAi.t is less than 0, and 0 otherwise; ∆Bi.t-1 is the change in book value of equity for ﬁrm i from year t-2 to 
year t-1, divided by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1; EA(k) identiﬁes the EA partition, k = 1 to 
6. Other variables are defined in the Table 4 and the EA partitions in the Figure 2. I run regressions for unbal-
anced panel sample over the period 1995 through 2012. The t statistics are based on the means and standard 
errors of the yearly coefficients as in Newey-West (1987), and they are adjusted for serial correlation in the year-
ly values. The p values are based on two-tailed t tests. All independent variables are winsorized at the top and the 
bottom 0.5% to control for outliers. ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Panel B 
reports the change in annual stock returns for one-standard deviation change in the level of earnings, change in 
earnings, or EA, calculated as the product of the average annually estimated coefficient and the average annual 
standard deviation of the corresponding earnings variable. Panel C reports the coefficient differences of each pair 
of EA partitions and the signiﬁcances of the differences based on the bootstrapping method of Mooney and Du-
val (1993). In each cell, the ﬁgure equals the coefficient on EA(i) minus the coefficient on EA(i+1), where i = 1, 
2, 3, 4, or 5. 
Independent variable 
Pred-
Sign Benchmark model Model (1a) Model (1b) 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.144 15.22*** 0.176 17.90*** 0.178 17.62*** 
Earnings + 1.186 9.23*** 1.173 8.61*** 1.155 8.52*** 
Neg. Earnings - (1.344) (5.07)*** (1.091) (4.12)*** (1.063) (4.03)*** 
∆Earnings + 0.043 0.34 0.175 1.06 0.044 0.27 
Neg. ∆Earnings - (0.141) (0.70) (0.764) (3.18)*** (0.726) (3.01)*** 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
(0.344) (2.25)** 
  NEA - Negative EA + 
  
0.861 10.11*** 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
0.997 1.73* 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
(0.258) (1.81)* 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
2.389 3.21*** 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
0.519 0.81 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
0.795 9.48 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
2.629 9.73 
ΔLagged equity BV - 0.410 6.93 0.509 8.64 0.512 8.70 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.990) (7.67) (1.126) (8.58) (1.123) (8.46) 
ΔDividends ? 1.774 5.54 1.733 5.36 1.784 5.50 
Book-to-market ? (0.211) (15.23) (0.237) (16.45) (0.234) (16.46) 
Adjusted R
2
   15.5%   17.0%   17.5%   
Number of observations 
 
10 148 
 
9 943 
 
9 943 
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    Column 1 (%) Column 2 (%) Column 3 (%) 
Panel B: Economic significance (stock returns change for a one-standard-deviation change in earnings) 
Earnings 
 
20.6 
 
20.3 
 
20.0 
 ∆Earnings 
 
0.7 
 
3.0 
 
0.7 
 PEA - Positive EA 
   
(4.6) 
   NEA - Negative EA 
   
10.6 
   EA1 - More positive 
     
13.0 
 EA2 - Revert to positive 
     
(3.9) 
 EA3 - Less negative 
     
11.7 
 EA4 - Less positive 
     
3.4 
 EA5 - Revert to negative 
    
11.5 
 EA6 - More negative   
    
21.1 
 
    
            
EA1    EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
Panel C :Coefficient comparison (bootstrapping) 
   EA1 
  
1.278** (1.637)** 0.124 0.270 (1.528)** 
EA2 
   
(2.915)*** (1.153)** (1.007)*** (2.805)*** 
EA3 
    
1.762** 1.908*** 0.110 
EA4 
     
0.146 (1.652)** 
EA5             (1.798)*** 
 
(1a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAi.t + a6NEAi.t + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + 
a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t +  ui.t       
(1b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EA(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 +  
a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t +  ui.t  
 
5.1.1.1 Contemporaneous returns with short-window stock returns 
 
The Appendix Table 22 reports the short-window results using three-day cumulative raw re-
turns centered on the annual earnings announcement date. The analysis setting is exactly the 
same as in the long-window model in Table 7, but practically none of the long-window results 
apply to the short-window, and my results are in total contradiction with those of Cao et al. 
(2011). The most plausible explanation, why I have mainly insignificant results between the 
short-window returns and EA variables is the low quality of the report dates data. Based on 
prior literature, I would have expected to see highly significant results. However, I must reject 
my hypothesis H1 considering the EA explaining short-window returns. Next, I report the 
quarterly results for H1.   
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5.1.1.2 Contemporaneous returns with quarterly data  
 
In the Appendix Table 23, I present the quarterly results for the long-window returns. Com-
pared to the annual data the results are very similar. Throughout the three regression models 
(benchmark, 1a, and 1b) the control variables are equally significant between the annual and 
quarterly data except for the negative change in earnings and the negative change in lagged 
equity book value. The significances of the EA variables may differ slightly from the annual 
data results, but the only truly different interpretation considers the partition EA3 (less nega-
tive). For the annual data the coefficient is positive (2.389) and highly significant, while for 
the quarterly data the coefficient is insignificant. The quarterly short-window returns suffer 
from similar data availability issues than the annual data and do not give meaningful results. 
However, the overall evidence suggests that the EA explains long-window returns also with 
the quarterly data, supporting H1.  
 
5.1.2 EA informativeness in predicting future earnings (H2) 
 
Table 8 presents the results for models (2a) and (2b); whether the EA is informative in pre-
dicting future earnings. My results are highly significant and in line with the prior literature of 
Cao et al. (2011). Column 1 presents the benchmark model results, which are mainly highly 
significant except for the earnings change, negative earnings change, and the negative change 
in lagged equity book value. Similarly to the benchmark model, all the control variables in 
(2a) and (2b) are significant or highly significant, except for the negative change in lagged 
equity book value.  More specifically, the change in dividends has a negative coefficient in all 
of the three models in 10% confidence level supporting the dividend signaling theory on fu-
ture earnings (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; and Jagannathan and Weisbach, 2000). To con-
tinue, the book-to-market coefficients are highly significant and negative for all of the three 
models, supporting the theory that the growth firms yield higher earnings, but are more highly 
priced in the market than the value firms. Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Haugen (1995) argue 
that the value premium in average returns arises because the market undervalues distressed 
stocks and overvalues growth stocks. The core idea in “growth investing” is to focus on 
stocks that are growing with potential for continued growth, while “value investing” seeks 
stocks that the market has underpriced, which have the potential for an increase when the 
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market corrects the price. The highly significant coefficients on earnings in the benchmark 
model (0.211), and in the models (2a) (0.217) and (2b) (0.215) indicate that roughly 20% of 
the current earnings persist in the next period. Cao et al. (2011) show 80% earnings persis-
tence levels with the U.S. data from 1966-2007. 
The incremental coefficient for negative earnings in the benchmark model, and in the models 
(2a) and (2b), is negative and highly significant, suggesting that the negative earnings are 
more persistent than the positive earnings. In the models (2a) and (2b), both the change and 
the negative change in earnings are highly significant. The earnings change indicates earnings 
mean reversion rate (-16.9% and -18.9%), which is of similar magnitude in my study than in 
the prior literature. Moreover, the incremental coefficients for the negative change in earnings 
are positive for the models (2a) and (2b), (24.7% and 26.2%), indicating that the negative 
earnings changes are more persistent.
23
   
The Column 2 results for (2a) present that the positive EA coefficient (PEA) is positive 
(0.158) and highly significant, and the negative EA coefficient (NEA) is negative (-0.225) and 
significant in 10% level. The results for (2b) in Column 3 confirm that the different EA parti-
tions explain future earnings. The signs are consistently negative for the coefficients of nega-
tive earnings growth, and positive for the coefficients of positive earnings growth with the 
absolute sizes being largest for the partitions EA1 (more positive; 0.604), EA3 (less negative; 
-0.572), and EA4 (less positive; 0.684). The results are highly significant for the partitions 
EA1 through EA4, and almost significant in 10% level for EA5 and EA6 (10.1%. and 11.0%). 
Overall, the earnings prediction results reveal that the EA is important in predicting future 
earnings, strongly supporting the H2, and that the negative EA patterns predict lower future 
earnings than the positive patterns, indicating that there may be some momentum evidence in 
the earnings persistence. The literature recognizes two related widely known investment strat-
egies. The first is the contrarian strategy studied by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) sug-
gesting that stock prices overreact to information, which makes contrarian strategies (buying 
                                                 
 
23
 Note that the opposite signs on the ∆Et coefficients in the contemporaneous returns and earnings predic-
tion models do not imply an inconsistency. The negative coefficient on ∆Et in the earnings prediction model 
captures the mean reversion of earnings (Fama and French, 2000), while the positive coefficient on ∆Et in the 
contemporaneous returns model is consistent with valuation theory (Ohlson, 1995) and with empirical evidence 
indicating that earnings changes are positively associated with returns (Kothari, 2001). 
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past losers and selling past winners) achieve abnormal returns. Although contrarian strategies 
have received a lot of academic attention, there is also a widely researched opposite strategy 
called the momentum, which buys past winners and sells past losers. Lev (1967), and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 1999) find significant evidence for this market anomaly assum-
ing that stocks with strong past performance continue to outperform stocks with poor past 
performance in the next period.  
 
Table 8: Regressions of future earnings on EA 
This table presents the regression results of 1-year ahead future earnings on EA. The dependent variable, Ei.t+1 is 
ROAi.t+1, or operating income after depreciation for ﬁrm i in t + 1 scaled by total assets at the end of year t; D1 is 
an indicator set to 1 if ROAi.t is negative. 0 otherwise; D2 is an indicator set to 1 if ∆ROAi.t is negative, 0 other-
wise, and all the other variables and regression characteristics in (2a) and (2b) are as deﬁned in Table 7. 
Independent variable Pred. Benchmark model Model (2a) Model (2b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.070 22.06*** 0.061 11.09*** 0.058 12.45*** 
Earnings + 0.211 4.18*** 0.217 4.41*** 0.215 4.67*** 
Neg. Earnings - (0.459) (2.09)** (0.539) (2.08)** (0.532) (2.09)** 
∆Earnings - (0.102) (1.50) (0.169) (2.63)*** (0.189) (2.92)*** 
Neg. ∆Earnings + 0.048 1.25 0.247 3.73*** 0.262 5.02*** 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
0.158 5.51*** 
  NEA - Negative EA ? 
  
(0.225) (1.68)* 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
0.604 7.12*** 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
0.159 5.20*** 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
(0.572) (2.72)*** 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
0.684 6.38*** 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
(0.237) (1.64) 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
(0.198) (1.60) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.042) (3.92)*** (0.060) (3.24)*** (0.056) (2.97)*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.033) (0.48) (0.007) (0.11) (0.018) (0.31) 
ΔDividends + (0.270) (1.73)* (0.257) (1.78)* (0.255) (1.78)* 
Book-to-market - (0.035) (4.70)*** (0.030) (5.46)*** (0.029) (5.32)*** 
Adjusted R
2
 2.9%   3.8%   4.1%   
Number of observations 10 879 
 
10 664 
 
10 664 
  
(2a) :  Ei.t+1 = b0 + b1Ei.t + b2(D1 * Ei.t) + b3ΔEi.t + b4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + b5PEAi.t + b6NEAi.t + b7ΔBi.t-1 + b8(D3 * ΔBi.t-
1) + b9ΔDi.t + b10BMi.t +  ei.t     
(2b) : Ei.t+1 = b0 + b1Ei.t + b2(D1 * Ei.t) + b3ΔEi.t + b4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + b5.k[EA(k)i.t] + b7ΔBi.t-1 +  
b8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + b9ΔDi.t + b10BMi.t +  ei.t  
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5.1.2.1 Future earnings with quarterly data 
 
The Appendix Table 24 presents the quarterly results for (2a) and (2b), which are mainly 
highly significant and very much in line with the annual results in Table 8. The main differ-
ence in the control variables is that unlike for the annual data, the negative earnings are gener-
ally non-significant in explaining the next quarter earnings. The most plausible explanation 
for this is the cyclicality in the company’s profit formation, and that the quarterly unaudited 
accounting items do not fully predict the future earnings. Also, having the annually paid divi-
dend variable in the quarterly analysis creates some additional noise, which I discuss more 
thoroughly in the data section. The EA coefficients are, however, significant and very similar 
to the annual results with the overall interpretation that the quarterly data seems to be far more 
sensitive to the negative EA information, which can be seen for example in the EA5 (revert to 
negative), which has become highly significant in the quarterly data compared to being non-
significant in the annual data. Overall, I find strong support for the H2 both with annual and 
quarterly data.  
 
5.1.3 Financial analysts using EA information to revise their forecasts (H3) 
 
Table 9 reports the results for the models (3a) and (3b), whether the financial analysts appear 
to use the EA information in their forecast revisions. The results from the benchmark model 
indicate that the analysts do revise their one-year earnings (EPS) forecasts based on the most 
recently announced earnings reports, which is in line with the prior literature. Moreover, all 
the benchmark regression variables are significant at either 5% or 1% confidence levels, ex-
cept for the change in dividends variable. Compared to the two previous regression models 
(1a) and (2a), the sample size in (3a) and (3b) is somewhat smaller due to the low availability 
of I/B/E/S forecast data. I try to overcome the problem by searching for alternative earnings 
forecast measures e.g. forecasts for shorter or longer EPS periods, forecasts on EBIT instead 
of EPS, and forecasts on earnings long-term growth rate, but the one-year-ahead EPS pro-
vides the highest number of usable observations with the least amount of noise. The second 
challenge is to combine the earnings forecast revisions with the imperfect data for earnings 
report dates, which is the most plausible reason that my results concerning the connection 
between EA and the forecast revisions do not show as significant results as Cao et al. (2011) 
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find with the U.S. data. The final methodological notion before analyzing the results is that 
my dependent variable (forecast revision) is logarithmic, because I consider the forecast revi-
sion as a percentage change.  
Column 2 reveals that the coefficient for positive EA (PEA) is positive, and the coefficient for 
negative EA (NEA) is negative. NEA is significant in the 5% level, but PEA is significant 
only in the 15% level. However, taken the caveats of the data availability into account, I be-
lieve this is a strong positive sign that EA is informative in the analyst forecast revisions. The 
results from model (3b) partially support the view of EA usefulness to the analysts by show-
ing that not only the traditional earnings figures are important determinants of forecast revi-
sions, but there is also evidence that the analysts look at the reversions in EA while adjusting 
their forecasts. EA5 (revert to negative) coefficient is negative and significant in 5% level, 
and the EA2 (revert to positive) is positive with a significance level of 14.8%. Hence, the 
overall results from Table 9 moderate support for annual H3, suggesting that the analysts con-
sider EA in their forecast revisions, and focus especially on EA reversals. The prior literature 
of Cao et al. (2011) show evidence that all the EA partitions except for EA4 (less positive) 
convey information to the forecast revisions, but there may be geographical and cultural fac-
tors explaining this difference in the results. Next, I present the quarterly results for H3. 
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Table 9: Regressions of analyst earnings forecast revision on EA 
This table presents the regression results of analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions on EA. The 
dependent variable, analyst 1-year-ahead earnings forecast revision (FRY1) is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of 
the percentage mean (consensus) analysts’ earnings forecast (EPS) revision of ﬁrm i for year t + 1 that becomes 
available to the market as soon as the annual earnings of year t are announced. All other variables and regression 
characteristics in (3a) and (3b) are as deﬁned in Table 7.  
Independent variable Pred. Benchmark model Model (3a) Model (3b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? (1.791) (13.42)*** (1.920) (13.60)*** (1.893) (13.21)*** 
Earnings ? (2.041) (2.24)** (1.839) (2.03)** (1.869) (2.05)** 
Neg. Earnings ? 3.675 1.96** 2.459 1.25 3.024 1.60 
∆Earnings ? 2.553 3.18*** 2.250 2.70*** 2.396 2.84*** 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? (6.270) (3.89)*** (4.558) (2.57)*** (5.592) (2.97)*** 
PEA - Positive EA ? 
  
1.372 1.43 
  NEA - Negative EA ? 
  
(3.507) (2.00)** 
  EA1 - More positive ? 
    
0.529 0.21 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
    
1.417 1.45 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
    
(6.509) (0.83) 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
    
(4.035) (0.62) 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
    
(4.173) (2.27)** 
EA6 - More negative ? 
    
3.534 0.98 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (1.580) (2.56)** (1.951) (3.10)*** (1.928) (3.05)*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? 1.864 2.22** 2.389 2.77*** 2.353 2.73*** 
ΔDividends ? 0.284 0.15 0.818 0.42 0.680 0.35 
Book-to-market ? 0.579 3.99*** 0.659 4.41*** 0.624 4.13*** 
Adjusted R
2
 6.1%   7.0%   7.8%   
Number of observations 930 
 
922 
 
922 
  
(3a) :  FRYi.t = c0 + c1Ei.t + c2(D1 * Ei.t) + c3ΔEi.t + c4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + c5PEAi.t + c6NEAi.t + c7ΔBi.t-1 + c8(D3 * ΔBi.t-
1) + c9ΔDi.t + c10BMi.t +  ςi.t       
(3b) : FRYi.t = c0 + c1Ei.t + c2(D1 * Ei.t) + c3ΔEi.t + c4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + c5.k[EA(k)i.t] + c7ΔBi.t-1 +  
c8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + c9ΔDi.t + c10BMi.t +  ςi.t       
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5.1.3.1 Earnings forecast revisions with quarterly data 
 
The Appendix Table 24 presents how the EA information explains the analyst forecast revi-
sions around the quarterly reporting dates. The quarterly results are somewhat different from 
the annual results with the control variables being overall non-significant in explaining the 
earnings forecast revisions. The quarterly results for model (3a) show significant positive co-
efficient for PEA (positive EA), and in (3b) there is a modest positive association with EA2 
(revert to positive) in 10% level, and a negative coefficient for the EA3 (less positive) in 5% 
level. The interpretation of these results suggests that the annual data explains better the fore-
cast revisions with the focus in negative EA patterns, while for the quarterly data the results 
are less clear with the focus on the positive EA patterns. Overall, the explanatory power for 
both quarterly and annual models of (3a) and (3b) is not especially high, seen from the low 
adjusted R
2
 figures, and from the low number of observations (922 and 634). Hence, based on 
the lack of observations and the results, there is only weak evidence to support the quarterly 
H3. 
 
5.1.4 EA conveying incremental information to forecast changes (H4) 
 
Table 10 reports the long-window results for estimating models (4a) and (4b), which are ef-
fectively the models (1a) and (1b) with an additional independent variable of change in ana-
lysts’ five-year EPS growth forecast. The overall results are comparable to those of models 
(1a) and (1b) in Table 7 with only minor changes in the significance levels of the EA varia-
bles. The most notable differences are in the partitions EA2 (revert to positive) and EA3 (less 
negative), which are no longer statistically significant in the model (4b). More importantly, 
the key value in the models (4a) and (4b) is to notice that the coefficient for the change in 
long-term earnings growth rate is significant and positive in all of the three regression models, 
with the EA coefficients being simultaneously significant. More specifically, the coefficient 
for the benchmark model is 0.258 in 10% level, the coefficient for (4a) is 0.286 in 5% level, 
and the coefficient for (4b) is 0.345 in 5% level. The joint interpretation is that EA conveys 
incremental information to the forward-looking analysts’ earnings growth forecasts. Therefore 
the subsequent assumption is that the analysts do not include all the pricing-related EA infor-
mation in their forecasts, leading to strong support for the annual H4 hypothesis. 
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Table 10: Regressions of annual returns on EA and the change in long-term forecasts 
This table presents the regression results of annual stock returns on EA and the change in analysts’ long-term-
growth forecasts. The dependent variable, Ri.t is annual buy-and-hold return for ﬁrm i over the period 9 months 
before to 3 months after the ﬁrm’s t ﬁscal year end and the ΔLTG is the mean (consensus) analysts’ forecast of 
long-term growth in earnings (5y EPS growth rate) immediately after earnings announcement minus the last 
available forecast immediately before the announcement. All other variables and regression characteristics in 
(4a) and (4b) are as deﬁned in Table 7.  
Independent variable Pred.  Benchmark model Model (4a) Model (4b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.063 1.82* 0.122 3.22*** 0.121 3.28*** 
Earnings + 2.923 6.70*** 2.797 6.49*** 2.846 6.68*** 
Neg. Earnings - (3.056) (3.55)*** (2.236) (2.64)*** (2.346) (2.81)*** 
∆Earnings + 0.317 0.59 0.473 0.78 0.244 0.39 
Neg. ∆Earnings - (1.369) (1.82)* (2.368) (2.90)*** (2.192) (2.67)*** 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
(0.409) (0.99) 
  NEA - Negative EA + 
  
1.528 5.88*** 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
2.757 1.78* 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
(0.482) (1.16) 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
3.122 1.50 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
(0.707) (0.46) 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
1.369 5.50*** 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
3.132 4.86*** 
ΔLagged equity BV - 0.294 1.73* 0.379 2.31** 0.330 2.02** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (1.959) (4.32)*** (2.064) (4.78)*** (1.975) (4.66)*** 
ΔDividends ? 4.199 4.82*** 3.736 4.31*** 3.869 4.46*** 
Book-to-market ? (0.374) (11.08)*** (0.406) (11.33)*** (0.398) (11.16)*** 
∆LT-forecast growth + 0.258 1.77* 0.286 1.97** 0.345 2.44** 
Adjusted R
2
 38.1%   39.5%   40.3%   
Number of observations 1 680 
 
1 663 
 
1 663 
  
(4a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAi.t + a6NEAi.t + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + 
a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + a11ΔLTGi.t + εi.t     
(4b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EA(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 +  
a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + a11ΔLTGi.t + εi.t    
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5.1.4.1 EA and changes in long-term growth forecasts explaining short-window returns 
 
The Appendix Table 26 presents the short-window results for estimating models (4a) and 
(4b). Again, the short-window results are mainly highly insignificant like in the Appendix 
Table 22 for the results for (1a) and (1b). However, one curious remark from the results is that 
despite all the other variables being insignificant, the coefficients for the changes in long-term 
earnings growth forecasts are positive and significant in 5% level. This may be evidence from 
the fact that there is not much earnings surprise on average, and that the EA information is 
already priced before the actual earnings announcement (see e.g. Matsumoto, 2002 for earn-
ings surprise effects). Based on these results, the market seems to find value-adding infor-
mation from the earnings announcements to adjust their views of the future long-term earn-
ings growth, which affects the stock prices in the short-term window. Post-earnings an-
nouncement drift could also provide another explanation stating that the three-day returns 
window is simply too short for the market to account for the new information (Bernard and 
Thomas 1989, 1990). However, based on very weak data evidence, I do not find support for 
the short-window H4 hypothesis. Next, I continue to the quarterly models of (4a) and (4b). 
 
5.1.4.2 EA and changes in long-term growth forecasts with quarterly data 
 
The Appendix Table 27 presents the quarterly results for the models (4a) and (4b), which are 
very similar to those of annual data. The change in analyst forecast coefficients are even more 
significant in the quarterly models (1% level) than in the annual models. As stated in the Ta-
ble 10, the annual data long-term returns associate highly with the negative EA patterns, while 
the quarterly results report strong returns associations with the positive EA variables; PEA 
(positive EA),  EA1 (more positive), and EA2 (revert to positive). The number of observa-
tions is roughly two times as high for the quarterly sample (2 462 compared to 1 663), but the 
adjusted R
2
 reduces from the annual 39.5% to the quarterly 14.3% in model (4b). The short-
window results are rather uninformative also for the quarterly sample due to the aforemen-
tioned data issues. The joint interpretation of the differences between the incremental EA in-
formation with the quarterly and annual data, is that the quarterly data conveys incremental 
information from the positive variables, and the annual data conveys incremental information 
from the negative variables. The quick conclusion would be that the analysts overestimate the 
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forecast revisions after the annual earnings announcements, and underestimate the forecast 
revisions after the quarterly earnings announcements. Overall, the results are in line with the 
prior studies of e.g. Cao et al. (2011), and I find strong support for the hypothesis H4 for both 
the annual and quarterly long-window data, but no support for the short-window results.  
   
5.2 Empirical results of what drives EA 
 
After discovering in the first research question that the EA conveys valuable information to 
the investors, in the second research question I study, what drives this EA information by ana-
lyzing whether the EA information derives from the cash flow or from the accruals compo-
nent of earnings (H5), whether the EA information differs between middle and large cap 
stocks (H6), and finally, whether the EA information value changes over time (H7).  
 
5.2.1 EA information deriving from cash or accruals (H5) 
 
Table 11 reports the differences in information between the EA caused by the operating cash 
flows and the earnings accruals. The regression equations are exactly the same as in (1a) and 
(1b) with the long-term returns as the dependent variable. The two earnings components are 
regressed in separate equations due to their high multicollinearity, and the results are present-
ed side by side in Table 11. The benchmark model in the first column is adjusted by adding 
the EA from accruals or EA from cash variable to the equation. The second column presents 
the model (5a), which divides the EA into positive and negative components, and the third 
column shows the results for (5b), which divides the EA into six different partitions. The ad-
justed R
2
 is roughly 16% throughout all the six regressions. The results show highly signifi-
cant coefficients (1% level) for all of the control variables, except for the change in earnings 
and the negative change in earnings variables. The benchmark model shows that the coeffi-
cient for the total EA from the cash flow is positive (0.268) and highly significant, and the 
total EA from accruals is close to zero (0.032) and non-significant. The results indicate that 
the EA information is derived from the operational cash flows and not from the accruals, 
which could mean that the markets can detect and value only the EA that derives from the 
increased cash flows and not from the discretional accruals that can be subject to earnings 
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management. The results support the view that the earnings management would not affect the 
long-term returns. The results from the model (5a) in the second column support the bench-
mark model evidence by showing more specifically that the EA value comes from the cash 
flow component of positive EA (PEA), which has a highly significant coefficient of 0.511. 
The reported result for negative EA (NEA) from cash flows is insignificant (0.032), and both 
the PEA (positive EA) and the NEA (negative EA) from the accruals EA are non-significant.  
Finally, the model (5b) sheds even more light on the phenomenon by showing positive and 
highly significant coefficients for the cash flow EA1 (more positive), EA2 (revert to positive), 
EA4 (less positive), and EA6 (more negative), while the coefficients for EA3 (less negative) 
and EA5 (revert to negative) are insignificant. The model (5b) for the accruals EA shows sig-
nificant negative coefficient only for the variable EA6 (more negative) in 5% confidence lev-
el. This could mean that the cash flow EA is the major determinant of the EA information 
value, and the accruals are only important to the shareholders when the EA pattern is very 
alarming, for example when the earnings growth is consequently declining (EA6). However, 
the literature offers some explanations, why the accruals-based EA6 (more negative) could be 
statistically significant. Firstly, for example Sloan (1996) discusses the accruals anomaly, 
where the investors cannot differentiate the earnings caused by accruals and the earnings 
caused by cash flows. Secondly, Shleifer (2000) finds evidence that the individuals extrapo-
late past trends from short histories too far into the future, indicating that the accruals EA6 
(more negative) would be over-interpreted as a negative sign for the future earnings. Thirdly, 
Dechow (2006) argues that the negative accruals indicate that the firms can be reducing their 
assets and downsizing their balance sheets to reflect the fair values. This argument is closely 
related to the increased bankruptcy risk presented by Hayn (1995), who suggests that the bal-
ance sheet downsizing is an indication of the firm exercising an abandonment option, which 
may finally lead to the firm exiting the business.  
I also perform similar cash flow versus accruals EA analysis for the short-window returns, for 
the future earnings (2a and 2b), and for the forecast revisions (3a and 3b). The results are not 
reported in this paper, because for the short-window of (5a and 5b) none of the explanatory 
variables are significant due to the bad quality data for the report dates. For the future earn-
ings models (2a) and (2b), the results are by definition significant for both cash flow and ac-
cruals, because the dependent variable includes both the elements of cash and accruals. For 
the earnings forecast revision models (3a) and (3b), the comparison is equally non-
meaningful.  
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Table 11: Regressions of annual returns on EA components of cash flow and accruals 
This table presents the regression results for the EA that derives from either cash flow or accruals component of earnings. The dependent variable Ri.t is the annual buy-and-
hold return for ﬁrm i, EAOCF is the cash flow component, and EAACCRUALS is the accruals component. All the other variables are deﬁned as in Table 7. 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model Model (5a) Model (5b) 
    CASH ACCRUALS CASH ACCRUALS CASH ACCRUALS 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.146 14.93*** 0.145 14.76*** 0.128 11.75*** 0.138 13.31*** 0.130 11.79*** 0.134 12.97*** 
Earnings ? 1.206 8.98*** 1.214 8.91*** 1.195 8.95*** 1.210 8.90*** 1.192 8.93*** 1.207 8.89*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (1.413) (5.23)*** (1.432) (5.23)*** (1.415) (5.24)*** (1.439) (5.25)*** (1.399) (5.18)*** (1.436) (5.25)*** 
∆Earnings ? 0.052 0.38 0.061 0.45 0.053 0.40 0.055 0.40 0.058 0.43 0.054 0.39 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? (0.124) (0.61) (0.131) (0.64) (0.111) (0.55) (0.109) (0.53) (0.132) (0.65) (0.101) (0.49) 
EA ? 0.268 4.36*** 0.032 0.60 
        
PEA - Positive EA ? 
    
0.511 5.02*** 0.123 1.43 
    
NEA - Negative EA ? 
    
0.032 0.35 (0.060) (0.73) 
    
EA1 - More positive ? 
        
0.947 3.05*** 0.372 1.31 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
        
0.448 3.96*** 0.133 1.43 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
        
0.522 0.78 0.441 0.73 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
        
0.965 2.37 0.350 1.15 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
        
(0.015) (0.15) (0.025) (0.30) 
EA6 - More negative ? 
        
0.732 2.84*** (0.794) (2.39)** 
ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.462 7.79*** 0.464 7.79*** 0.458 7.77*** 0.461 7.72*** 0.460 7.82*** 0.463 7.81*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (1.035) (7.91)*** (1.038) (7.69)*** (1.027) (7.86)*** (1.030) (7.59)*** (1.029) (7.89)*** (1.032) (7.62)*** 
ΔDividends ? 1.818 5.52*** 1.817 5.49*** 1.819 5.53*** 1.817 5.49*** 1.825 5.56*** 1.812 5.48*** 
Book-to-market ? (0.221) (16.02)*** (0.222) (15.93)*** (0.218) (15.97)*** (0.220) (15.69)*** (0.218) (16.02)*** (0.220) (15.65)*** 
Adjusted R2 16.3% 
 
16.1% 
 
16.5% 
 
16.1% 
 
16.6% 
 
16.2% 
 
Number of observations 9 736 
 
9 695 
 
9 736 
 
9 695 
 
9 736 
 
9 695 
 
 
(5a): Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAOCF/ACCRUALS + a6NEAOCF/ACCRUALS + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t  
(5b): Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EAOCF/ACCRUALS(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t          
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5.2.1.1 EA information deriving from cash or accruals with quarterly data 
 
The Appendix Table 28 presents the quarterly results for whether the EA information value 
derives from the cash or from the accruals. On a high level, the annual and quarterly results 
show similarly significant coefficients for the cash flow variables and similarly non-
significant results for the accruals variables. On a more detailed level, there are slight differ-
ences in the annual and quarterly EA patterns explaining the long-window returns, with the 
quarterly results being slightly weaker. Contrary to the annual results, the quarterly bench-
mark model EA variable is not significant, and while the annual model (5a) has significant 
coefficient for the positive EA, the quarterly model shows the same with the negative EA.  
The model (5b) shows the differences in the annual and quarterly EA patterns. In the annual 
data the partitions EA1 (more positive), EA2 (revert to positive), and EA6 (more negative) are 
highly significant, suggesting that the patterns with either continuing positive or negative 
earnings growth convey valuable information. For the quarterly data, only the patterns EA2 
(revert to positive), EA3 (less positive), and EA4 (less negative) are highly significant, sug-
gesting that the fundamental difference between the annual and quarterly data is that the an-
nual data values the extreme EA patterns, and the quarterly data values the mean reverting EA 
patterns. The interpretation would be that the market pays more attention to, and draws 
stronger inferences from the annual reports and then only adjusts their views based on the 
quarterly reports. Kothari (2001) summarizes some pros and cons of using quarterly data in 
the studies by stating that the quarterly data is more seasonal and timelier. Salamon and 
Stober (1994) specify that the errors in the expense estimates occurring during the first three 
quarters will be reversed in the last quarter, and Hopwood et al (1982) argue that there are 
theoretically four times as many quarterly than annual observations, leading to larger samples 
and reduced survivorship bias. For the possible downsides, Kothari (2001) lists the increased 
incidence of transitory items, and the fact that the quarterly reports are not audited. Although, 
most of the earnings management research is based on annual data, there is a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that the quarterly data is more prone to include managerial discretion due 
to its unaudited nature (Shivakumar, 1997; and Rangan, 1998). Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) 
also detect slightly lower R
2
-values for the quarterly, than for the annual regressions. Overall, 
both annual and quarterly long-window results show strong support for the H5 that the EA 
information value derives from the operational cash flows and not from the earnings accruals. 
Next, I continue to the EA information between the large and middle cap firms. 
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5.2.2 EA information differing between the large and middle cap firms (H6)  
 
After discovering that the EA information value derives from the operating cash flows com-
ponent of earnings, I divide my sample into the middle and large cap stocks based on Thom-
son One categorization. In the following sections, I show the EA association with the annual 
long-window returns (models 6a1 and 6b1), future earnings (models 6a2 and 6b2), and revi-
sions in the earnings growth forecasts (models 6a3 and 6b3). 
  
5.2.2.1 Large and middle cap firm EA explaining stock returns  
 
Table 12 illustrates the association between the EA and the annual long-window returns for 
the large and middle cap firms. The middle cap sample size (7 649) is over three times the 
size for the large cap (2 294), but the overall sample size is still large enough to draw infer-
ences based on the results. The control variables are mainly highly significant for all of the 
models with the exception that the variable for negative earnings is only significant for the 
middle cap stocks and the change in earnings variable is not significant for neither of the 
samples. The EA coefficients are highly significant for both the middle and large cap samples 
in all of the three models. In the model (6a1) in Table 12 the only difference between the two 
samples is that the PEA (positive EA) is not significant for the large cap sample. In the model 
(6b1) the coefficients are highly significant for the partitions EA3 (less negative), EA5 (revert 
to negative) and EA6 (more negative) for both large and middle cap firms, and additionally, 
the EA2 (revert to positive) is significant in 10% level for the middle cap sample. As a con-
clusion, the long-window returns for the large cap firms seem to be affected only by the nega-
tive EA and the negative earnings variables in general, while the middle cap firms are other-
wise similar, but there is some evidence that also the positive EA information has some effect 
on the long-window returns. Some possible explanations for why only the negative EA infor-
mation is valuable for the large cap firms and not for the middle cap firms can derive from the 
generally higher institutional ownership of large cap stocks, with specific trading rules, or 
from the generally higher analyst following and the better quality of financial statement anal-
ysis as discussed in the section 4.3.6.  
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Table 12: Regressions of annual raw returns on large and middle cap EA 
This table presents the regression results for the long-window stock returns explaining the EA that derives from either middle or large cap firms. The dependent variable Ri.t is 
the annual buy-and-hold return for ﬁrm i. EALARGE is the EA for the large cap subsample and EAMIDDLE is the EA for the middle cap subsample. All the other variables are 
deﬁned as in Table 7. 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model 
 
Model (6a1) 
 
Model (6b1) 
  
LARGE MIDDLE 
 
LARGE MIDDLE 
 
LARGE MIDDLE 
  
Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
 
Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
 
Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.159 6.39*** 0.150 14.40*** 
 
0.178 6.63*** 0.178 16.67*** 
 
0.180 6.75*** 0.180 16.26*** 
Earnings ? 1.027 3.88*** 1.226 8.11*** 
 
1.018 3.89*** 1.189 7.75*** 
 
0.963 3.62*** 1.176 7.65*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (0.888) (1.75)* (1.344) (4.40)*** 
 
(0.747) (1.42) (1.127) (3.72)*** 
 
(0.641) (1.20) (1.104) (3.64)*** 
∆Earnings ? 0.097 0.40 (0.157) (0.91) 
 
0.225 0.81 0.150 0.81 
 
0.166 0.65 0.009 0.05 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? (0.613) (1.71)* (0.071) (0.31) 
 
(0.943) (2.06)** (0.720) (2.66)*** 
 
(0.886) (2.02)** (0.685) (2.47)** 
EA ? 0.632 2.53** 0.282 3.65*** 
          
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
0.033 0.07 (0.336) (2.40)** 
     
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
1.150 4.58*** 0.792 8.70*** 
     
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
1.499 1.15 0.907 1.44 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
(0.165) (0.36) (0.227) (1.72)* 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
5.147 2.75*** 1.787 2.28** 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
2.404 0.96 0.161 0.30 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
1.082 4.23*** 0.725 8.25*** 
EA6 - More negative ? 
          
1.510 2.10** 2.654 9.15*** 
ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.626 4.73*** 0.448 6.84*** 
 
0.659 4.84*** 0.481 7.31*** 
 
0.661 4.78*** 0.483 7.40*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (1.616) (3.87)*** (0.972) (7.35)*** 
 
(1.664) (3.95)*** (1.043) (7.85)*** 
 
(1.698) (3.98)*** (1.032) (7.70)*** 
ΔDividends ? 2.681 3.09*** 1.537 4.53*** 
 
2.658 3.11*** 1.537 4.58*** 
 
2.697 3.18*** 1.587 4.73*** 
Book-to-market ? (0.269) (7.02)*** (0.215) (14.63)*** 
 
(0.279) (6.85)*** (0.231) (14.97)*** 
 
(0.275) (6.91)*** (0.229) (14.98)*** 
Adjusted R2 20.6% 
 
15.4% 
  
21.0% 
 
16.4% 
  
21.4% 
 
17.0% 
 
Number of observations 2 294 
 
7 649 
  
2 294 
 
7 649 
  
2 294 
 
7 649 
 
(6a1) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEALARGE/MIDDLE + a6NEALARGE/MIDDLE + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t 
(6b1) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EALARGE/MIDDLE(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.
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5.2.2.1.1 Large and middle cap firm EA explaining stock returns with quarterly data 
 
The Appendix Table 29 shows the quarterly results for the large and middle cap firm EA as-
sociation with the long-window contemporaneous stock returns. Quite surprisingly, there 
seems to be rather large differences between the quarterly and annual results suggesting that 
the quarterly EA is non-significant in explaining the large cap stocks long-window returns. 
The difference is rather large compared to the annual large cap results showing support for the 
negative EA conveying valuable returns information. For the middle cap stocks the results are 
generally similar with annual and quarterly data, with the difference that while the annual data 
results are more affected by the negative EA information, the quarterly data does not differen-
tiate between the negative or positive EA, but is mostly concerned with the EA reversals in 
both directions; EA2 (revert to positive) and EA5 (revert to negative), and with the continued 
patterns of either increasing or decreasing earnings growth; EA1 (more positive) and EA6 
(more negative).  
Before drawing any conclusions, it should be noted that the annual sample size is 2 294 large 
cap and 7 649 middle cap observations, and the quarterly sample size is 2 355 large cap and 3 
392 middle cap observations. It is important to notice that the corresponding annual and quar-
terly observations are not necessarily from the same time periods due to the more limited 
quarterly data availability. The result is that the annual observations represent generally better 
the whole sample period, whereas the quarterly observations are more concentrated around 
the more recent years. Therefore, there can also be other explanatory factors besides the com-
pany size that affect the results. Secondly, the overall explanatory power of the model is 
weaker for the quarterly data, and the annual data has higher adjusted R
2
 for the large cap 
stocks while the quarterly data has higher R
2
 for the middle cap stocks. Conclusively, the an-
nual data sees value in the negative EA information for both the large and middle cap firms, 
while the quarterly EA does not explain the large cap long-window returns, and values highly 
the middle cap firms’ EA reversals. Hence, I find only weak support that the large and middle 
cap firms convey similar information to support H6a. 
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5.2.2.2 Large and middle cap firm EA explaining future earnings 
 
Table 13 shows the association between the large and middle cap firm EA and future earn-
ings. Again, the middle cap sample size (6 986) is twice the size of the annual sample (3 678). 
The control variables are mainly highly significant for both large and middle cap companies 
with the only exception being the change in dividends, which is significant for neither, and 
the negative change in lagged book value, which is only moderately significant for the large 
cap companies. The EA coefficients are slightly different for the large and middle cap stocks; 
in the benchmark model the EA coefficient is positive and highly significant for the large cap 
companies, but negative and non-significant for the middle cap firms. The model (6a2) in the 
second column confirms that the association between EA and future earnings is indeed 
stronger for the large cap companies, with both the PEA (positive EA) and the NEA (negative 
EA) being significant, and for the middle cap companies only the PEA (positive EA) being 
highly significant.  
Finally, the model (6b2) in the third column shows that the results between the large and mid-
dle cap stocks are fairly similar and highly significant for the partitions EA1-EA4, which rep-
resent either positive change in earnings or positive EA. However, for the partitions EA5 (re-
vert to negative) and EA6 (more negative), the coefficients are significant only for the large 
cap sample. Overall, the results suggest that the EA explains future earnings for both large 
and middle cap companies, but that the correlations are generally stronger for the large cap 
stocks. Fama and French (1995) show that the firm size is related to profitability, which can 
also be seen from my sample that the large cap firms have higher EA coefficients than the 
middle cap firms. Furthermore, Kothari (1987) shows evidence that the firm size and the earn-
ings persistence are positively correlated, which supports my findings of larger coefficients 
and higher significances for the large cap future earnings. Kothari also argues that given the 
amount and timeliness of the information processed by market participants, the price changes 
and the earnings information should signal future earnings changes earlier for the large than 
for the small firms. The results are also in line with the casual observation that there are great-
er numbers of traders and professional analysts expending resources on information activities 
with respect to large versus small firms. Hence, I find only moderate support for H6b that the 
middle and large cap firms convey similar information on future earnings.  
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Table 13: Regressions of future earnings on large and middle cap EA 
This table presents the regression results for the future earnings explaining the EA that derives from either middle or large cap firms. The dependent variable Ei.t+1 is operating 
income after depreciation for ﬁrm i in t + 1 scaled by total assets at the end of year t. EALARGE is the EA for the large and EAMIDDLE is the EA for the middle cap subsample. 
All the other variables are deﬁned as in Table 7.  
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model 
 
Model (6a2) 
 
Model (6b2) 
  
LARGE MIDDLE 
 
LARGE MIDDLE 
 
LARGE MIDDLE 
  
Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
 
Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
 
Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.072 24.78*** 0.069 13.85*** 
 
0.064 22.02*** 0.060 6.81*** 
 
0.061 20.91*** 0.057 7.58*** 
Earnings ? 0.157 6.10*** 0.215 3.82*** 
 
0.164 6.39*** 0.228 3.75*** 
 
0.152 5.64*** 0.228 4.04*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (0.262) (4.20)*** (0.567) (1.64)* 
 
(0.325) (5.09)*** (0.640) (1.71)* 
 
(0.317) (4.90)*** (0.636) (1.73)* 
∆Earnings ? (0.052) (2.29)** (0.078) (1.87)* 
 
(0.107) (4.06)*** (0.185) (2.23)** 
 
(0.125) (4.61)*** (0.207) (2.50)** 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? 0.071 1.79* 0.047 1.00 
 
0.215 4.57*** 0.270 2.70*** 
 
0.265 5.38*** 0.285 3.55*** 
EA ? 0.088 2.83*** (0.090) (0.85) 
          
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
0.302 5.49*** 0.124 3.74*** 
     
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
(0.110) (2.13)** (0.262) (1.47) 
     
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
0.884 5.61*** 0.495 5.18*** 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
0.256 5.27*** 0.137 3.85*** 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
(1.044) (3.27)*** (0.544) (2.32)** 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
0.772 3.98*** 0.629 5.20*** 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
(0.132) (2.91)*** (0.274) (1.44) 
EA6 - More negative ? 
          
(0.355) (2.01)** (0.198) (1.49) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.038) (2.29)** (0.054) (2.53)** 
 
(0.051) (3.00)*** (0.065) (2.58)*** 
 
(0.049) (2.72)*** (0.062) (2.38)** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.042 1.63 (0.047) (0.58) 
 
0.061 2.38** (0.025) (0.34) 
 
0.047 1.79* (0.032) (0.46) 
ΔDividends ? (0.072) (1.29) (0.345) (1.59) 
 
(0.054) (0.97) (0.348) (1.61) 
 
(0.044) (0.78) (0.346) (1.64) 
Book-to-market ? (0.032) (6.46)*** (0.035) (4.35)*** 
 
(0.027) (5.77)*** (0.029) (5.04)*** 
 
(0.026) (5.39)*** (0.029) (4.88)*** 
Adjusted R^2 10.4% 
 
3.2% 
  
12.9% 
 
3.9% 
  
15.2% 
 
4.1% 
 
Number of observations 3 678 
 
6 986 
  
3 678 
 
6 986 
  
3 678 
 
6 986 
 
 
(6a2) : Ei.t+1 = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5PEALARGE/MIDDLE + a6NEALARGE/MIDDLE + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t  
(6b2) : Ei.t+1 = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EALARGE/MIDDLE(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t         
61 
 
5.2.2.2.1 Large and middle cap firm EA explaining future earnings with quarterly data 
 
The Appendix Table 30 presents the large and middle cap firm quarterly EA association with 
the future period earnings. The annual and quarterly results are mainly similar with the excep-
tion that while the annual data for the large cap sample suggests that all the different EA pat-
terns are informative, the quarterly data does not find the extreme patterns EA1 (more posi-
tive) and EA6 (more negative) informative, but is more concentrated on the information of the 
EA reversals; EA2 (revert to positive) and EA5 (revert to negative), and overall on the mean 
reverting EA patterns EA3 (less positive) and EA4 (less negative). For the middle cap firms, 
the annual data assumes a positive and highly significant association between the future earn-
ings and PEA (positive EA), and between the positive or increasing earnings growth parti-
tions; EA1 (more positive), EA2 (revert to positive), EA3 (less negative), and EA4 (less posi-
tive).  
Also, the quarterly results show moderately significant coefficients in the model (6a1), for the 
NEA (negative EA), and in the model (6b2), for the EA4 (less positive) and EA5 (revert to 
negative). Based on the annual and quarterly sample sizes and the regression model R
2
, even 
though the number of observations decreases for the middle cap sample between the annual 
and quarterly models, the overall explanatory power increases. The concluding remarks for 
this model are that the quarterly and annual EA data explain mainly similarly the future earn-
ings for both large and middle cap firms with the emphasis slightly more in the mean reversal 
information with the quarterly sample. Within the quarterly results, there are no major differ-
ences between the large and middle cap firms, which shows support the H6b 
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5.2.2.3 Large and middle cap firm EA explaining forecast revisions 
 
Table 14 presents the associations between the subsamples of large and middle cap firm EA 
and the revisions of the long-term earnings growth rate forecasts. The number of observations 
is fairly small for both large cap (889) and middle cap (820) samples, and due to the low 
availability of the forecast revision data, I expect the results to be somewhat noisy. The con-
trol variables are mainly insignificant, but the value of this model lies on the interpretation of 
the EA variables in models (6a3) and (6b3).  The results show moderate evidence that only 
the extreme EA patterns (EA1 (more positive) and EA6 (more negative)) affect the revisions 
of the middle cap firms’ growth forecasts. For the large cap firms the results are similar to the 
previous models of future earnings and annual returns that only the negative EA patterns EA5 
(revert to negative) and EA6 (more negative), and the negative earnings growth pattern EA3 
(less negative) affect the forecast revisions. The large cap coefficient for the NEA (negative 
EA) in (6a3) is negative and significant in 5% level.  
Conclusively, the EA is informative for both firm sizes, but the large cap companies are more 
affected by the negative EA information than are the middle cap companies.  This finding is 
also in line with the theory of for example Kothari (1987), which states that there is more val-
uable information available, and more effort spent on assessing the forecasted earnings of 
larger than smaller firms. Hence, I find only moderate support for H63 with the annual data 
that the EA conveys similar information to the large and middle cap firms. 
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Table 14: Regressions of analysts' forecast revisions on large and middle cap EA 
This table presents the regression results for the analyst forecast revisions explaining the EA that derives from either middle or large cap firms. The dependent variable, 
∆LTG is the change in mean analysts’ forecast of long-term growth in EPS immediately after earnings announcement minus the last available forecast immediately before the 
announcement. EALARGE is the EA for the large and EAMIDDLE is the EA for the middle cap subsample. All the other variables are deﬁned as in Table 7.  
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model  Model (6a3)  Model (6b3) 
  LARGE MIDDLE  LARGE MIDDLE  LARGE MIDDLE 
  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.002 0.18 0.006 0.56  (0.007) (0.71) 0.004 0.35  (0.011) (1.07) 0.003 0.26 
Earnings ? (0.079) (0.69) (0.201) (2.24)**  (0.059) (0.51) (0.200) (2.23)**  (0.047) (0.40) (0.213) (2.34)** 
Neg. Earnings ? 0.120 0.36 0.546 1.99**  0.049 0.15 0.530 1.87*  (0.001) 0.00 0.557 2.06** 
∆Earnings ? (0.049) (0.47) 0.009 0.10  (0.089) (0.80) (0.008) (0.09)  (0.080) (0.71) 0.039 0.39 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? 0.042 0.21 (0.268) (1.35)  0.142 0.65 (0.232) (1.03)  0.163 0.75 (0.243) (1.10) 
EA ? (0.097) (1.36) 0.004 0.06           
PEA - Positive EA ?      0.058 0.62 0.036 0.50      
NEA - Negative EA ?      (0.264) (2.23)** (0.026) (0.30)      
EA1 - More positive ?           (0.055) (0.26) (0.702) (2.08)** 
EA2 - Revert to positive ?           0.080 0.84 0.045 0.63 
EA3 - Less negative ?           (1.730) (2.56)** (0.476) (1.05) 
EA4 - Less positive ?           0.152 0.59 0.311 0.67 
EA5 - Revert to negative ?           (0.272) (2.21)** 0.022 0.25 
EA6 - More negative ?           (0.411) (2.06)** (0.581) (1.82)* 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.087) (1.66)* (0.099) (1.16)  (0.091) (1.74)* (0.099) (1.17)  (0.085) (1.66)* (0.090) (1.12) 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.078) (0.72) 0.145 1.28  (0.075) (0.70) 0.143 1.28  (0.080) (0.75) 0.115 1.08 
ΔDividends ? (0.280) (1.26) 0.308 1.51  (0.253) (1.15) 0.313 1.52  (0.274) (1.22) 0.252 1.22 
Book-to-market ? 0.012 1.53 0.028 2.16**  0.016 2.03** 0.029 2.14**  0.016 2.11** 0.027 1.99** 
Adjusted R^2 3.9%  4.6%   4.5%  4.7%   5.3%  6.5%  
Number of observations 889  820   889  820   889  820  
(6a3) : ∆LTG i.t =a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5PEALARGE/MIDDLE + a6NEALARGE/MIDDLE + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t  
(6b3) : ∆LTG i.t =a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EALARGE/MIDDLE(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3* ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t      
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5.2.2.3.1 Large and middle cap EA explaining forecast revisions with quarterly data  
 
The Appendix Table 31 presents the quarterly results for the large and middle cap firm EA 
explaining the revisions in the long-term growth rates. The first remark is that the results are 
generally rather insignificant and the adjusted R
2
 drops from the annual 5% to the quarterly 
less than 2%. Moreover, the number of observations is very low (1 206 middle cap, and 1 373 
large cap observations). Hence, the quarterly model also suffers from the data availability 
challenges deteriorating the credibility of the inferences. However, despite the totally insignif-
icant annual and quarterly control variables, there seems to be weak evidence of positive EA 
information value in the quarterly results for both large and middle cap firms. This is slightly 
contradictive to the annual results, where the weak association between the large cap EA and 
forecast revisions derives from the negative EA, and for the middle cap firms from the ex-
treme EA patterns. Overall, the somewhat noisy results suggest that the EA information is not 
quite similar for the large and middle cap firms, which is in contradiction with the H63.  
 
5.2.3 EA information differing over time before and after 2008 (H7)  
 
Before reporting how the EA information value has changed before and after 2008, Table 15 
presents how the amount of observations in each category has remained relatively stable dur-
ing the observation period 2004-2011. The only exception is the financial crisis 2007-08, 
which temporarily increases the number of observations in the negative EA partitions.    
 
Table 15: Annual distribution of observations between EA partitions 
This table presents the annual distribution of observations in each EA category. Besides the years of economic 
crisis in 2007-2008, the category sizes have remained relatively stable from 2004 to 2011. 
Year PEA NEA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
2004 51% 49% 8% 31% 6% 12% 39% 5% 
2005 37% 63% 6% 26% 10% 5% 40% 12% 
2006 65% 35% 9% 49% 6% 7% 24% 5% 
2007 43% 57% 9% 21% 6% 12% 45% 6% 
2008 23% 77% 1% 18% 14% 4% 40% 22% 
2009 54% 46% 5% 45% 14% 4% 17% 15% 
2010 62% 38% 9% 39% 5% 14% 31% 3% 
2011 35% 65% 6% 22% 9% 8% 47% 10% 
Average 46% 54% 7% 31% 9% 8% 35% 10% 
 65 
 
After discovering that the EA information preconditions have not altered during my observa-
tion period, I present the results of the regression equations (7a) and (7b) in Table 16, explain-
ing the EA association with the stock returns over time. The cut-off point between my two 
subsamples is the year 2008, during which the financial crisis and IFRS implementation takes 
place. The sample size for the Pre-2008 (3 968) is slightly smaller than for the Post-2008      
(5 975), and the adjusted R
2
 in (7a) increases roughly 5% between the samples from 15.4% to 
20.7%, suggesting that the overall financial statement information value has increased over 
time.  
The control variables are mainly highly significant, with a fist remark that the change in divi-
dends has become highly significant over time for all of the models. The second remark is the 
adverse effect with the earnings change coefficients, which have become insignificant in the 
Post-2008 for all of the models. Lev (1989) suggests that the low correlation between earn-
ings changes and returns is often attributed to deficiencies in the accounting measurement 
system. Hence, the IFRS implementation could partially explain the change in the coefficient 
significances. Concerning the change in EA information value, the results are fairly similar 
over time. Overall, I do not consider that the EA information value has changed during my 
observation period. I also perform similar non-tabulated tests for the time-effects on the future 
earnings and revisions in analyst forecasts, but the results show no differences between the 
samples. Hence, based on the reported results I find strong support for H7 stating the EA in-
formation has not changed over time. Also, I do not present the quarterly results for H7, be-
cause the Pre-2008 data sample is not large enough for meaningful analysis due to the skewed 
data. 
At this point, I have presented and analyzed all the annual and quarterly results for the eight 
hypotheses, with the summarizing conclusions that the EA conveys valuable information to 
the investors, based on stock returns and the capability of predicting future earnings and ana-
lyst forecast revisions. In the second research question, I discover that the information value is 
driven by the cash flow component of earnings, signaling the market’s ability to differentiate 
the real operating earnings growth from the earnings growth derived from the accounting 
items that may contain managerial discretion. I also conclude that without minor differences, 
the results are applicable irrespective of the company size, and over time. Finally, I conclude 
that the quarterly data EA conveys similarly valuable and partially complementary infor-
mation to the markets than does the annual EA. In the following section I present the various 
robustness checks to show that my results hold also in a broader setting.  
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Table 16: Regressions of annual stock returns on EA before and after 2008 
This table presents the regression results explaining the long-window stock returns for the EA that takes place before and after 2008. The dependent variable Ri.t is the annual 
buy-and-hold return for ﬁrm i. EABEFORE is the EA for the subsample before 2008 and EAAFTER is the EA subsample after 2008. All other variables are deﬁned as in Table 7. 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model   Model (7a3)   Model (7b3) 
    BEFORE AFTER   BEFORE AFTER   BEFORE AFTER 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.147 12.24*** 0.151 10.34*** 
 
0.171 13.65*** 0.177 11.81*** 
 
0.177 13.93*** 0.173 11.31*** 
Earnings ? 0.782 5.53*** 1.346 6.17*** 
 
0.752 5.34*** 1.317 5.93*** 
 
0.727 5.22*** 1.316 5.90*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (1.150) (3.58)*** (1.397) (3.60)*** 
 
(0.980) (3.08)*** (1.170) (2.99)*** 
 
(0.982) (3.12)*** (1.165) (2.97)*** 
∆Earnings ? 0.434 2.71*** (0.326) (1.32) 
 
0.642 3.58*** (0.050) (0.19) 
 
0.559 3.18*** (0.213) (0.81) 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? (0.322) (1.49) (0.106) (0.36) 
 
(0.819) (3.07)*** (0.688) (1.95)* 
 
(0.782) (2.97)*** (0.636) (1.76)* 
EA ? 0.163 1.53 0.312 2.89*** 
          
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
(0.320) (1.75)* (0.360) (1.66)* 
     
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
0.688 5.25*** 0.785 6.80*** 
     
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
0.390 0.71 1.481 1.62 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
(0.371) (2.26)** (0.166) (0.84) 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
3.727 2.13** 1.421 1.73* 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
0.126 0.16 1.622 1.69* 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
0.634 4.79*** 0.693 6.24*** 
EA6 - More negative ? 
          
2.680 5.34*** 2.393 6.98*** 
ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.807 11.12*** 0.164 1.90* 
 
0.809 11.26*** 0.225 2.53** 
 
0.813 11.45*** 0.219 2.44** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.830) (5.73)*** (0.878) (5.40)*** 
 
(0.831) (5.83)*** (0.999) (5.81)*** 
 
(0.837) (5.98)*** (0.970) (5.63)*** 
ΔDividends ? (0.045) (0.13) 2.176 5.01*** 
 
(0.024) (0.07) 2.139 5.04*** 
 
0.001 0.00 2.178 5.09*** 
Book-to-market ? (0.177) (11.15)*** (0.232) (12.42)*** 
 
(0.188) (11.91)*** (0.249) (12.29)*** 
 
(0.186) (11.91)*** (0.245) (12.24)*** 
Adjusted R2 14.7%   19.9%     15.4%   20.7%     15.8%   21.3%   
Number of observations 3 968 
 
5 975 
  
3 968 
 
5 975 
  
3 968 
 
5 975 
  
(7a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5PEABEFORE/AFTER + a6NEABEFORE/AFTER + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t  
(7b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EABEFORE/AFTER (k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3* ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t 
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6. Robustness checks 
 
In this section I perform the following robustness checks to verify that my results hold also in 
a more general setting. My robustness checks are divided into two main categories based on 
whether the concern is on the EA variable definition or whether the robustness checks test for 
the results in general. Moreover, I test my results with three different regression types; the 
standard linear regression with Huber-White robust standard errors, with the different lags of 
Newey-West estimator, and finally with the Fama MacBeth (1973) method. The results be-
tween the Huber-White and Newey-West methods are effectively equally significant, but the 
Fama Macbeth (1973) method that Cao et al. (2011) use in studying the EA, provide very low 
significances with my data due to the shorter time window from 1995 to 2012. Hence, I con-
clude that my results are robust for the different regression methods. Secondly, I follow Cao 
et al. (2011) in dropping the outlier observations with very low stock price, < 2USD, but my 
results are also robust for alternative cut-off points such as 1USD and 3USD. Thirdly, my 
data is winsorized at the 0.5% level, and this cut-off is also robust to alternative figures such 
as 1% or 5%, with the remark that the more the extreme observations are smoothed, the more 
significant the results relatively become. However, the overall interpretation of the results 
remains the same. Next, I present the two categories of more specified robustness checks.  
 
6.1 General robustness checks 
6.1.1 Earnings variable valuation being conditional on the level of profitability 
 
My research questions analyze the unconditional valuation of EA, but it is possible that the 
valuation of EA is conditional on some fundamental variables. I follow Chen and Zhang 
(2007), who show that the valuation of earnings variables is conditional on the level of profit-
ability, which is measured by ROE, and which is calculated as the earnings scaled by the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the year (ROEt = OIt / BVt-1). The ROEt figures are parti-
tioned into low, medium and high levels, which I interact with the change in earnings (∆Et) 
and with different EA variables in the long-window returns regressions. The ROE partitions 
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are ROE(L/M/H)t describing the low, medium and high earnings levels. Below, I describe the 
regression equation to analyze the EA association being conditional on the profitability. 
(11) 
Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3(ROE(L/M/H)* ΔEi.t) + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5(ROE(L/M/H)* EAt) + 
a6ΔBi.t-1 + a7(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a8ΔDi.t + a9BMi.t + εi.t     
The results suggest small differences in the significances of the different EA variables, but the 
overall results hold that EA is a highly significant explanatory factor in the long-window re-
turns irrespective of the profitability of the firm. 
 
6.1.2 The returns being sensitive to the analyst forecast estimation period 
 
I test the analyst forecast estimation period sensitiveness to the first research question hypoth-
eses H4 and H5. I study my results with the EPS forecast periods of one quarter, one year, and 
the forecast of earnings growth rate for five years. I also attempt to use the EBIT forecasts, 
but the I/B/E/S data availability for EBIT forecasts is extremely low. Overall, the results be-
tween the different forecast periods are generally similar, despite the small differences in the 
coefficient significances. These small differences can derive both from the differences in the 
variable informativeness, and from the differences in the variable data availability. My results 
are in line with the literature of Cao et al. (2011), and do not find support that the forecast 
estimation period would significantly affect the results. 
 
6.1.3 Using alternative measures of earnings  
 
Income before extraordinary items is the principal earnings measure in my study. However, 
prior studies of for example Daniel and Titman (2006) and Chan et al. (2003, 2004) use also 
net income as their earnings measure, which is why I test, whether the earnings change meas-
ure from earnings before extraordinary item to net income after taxes would affect my results. 
The results are very similar with both earnings measures for both annual and quarterly data, 
which is also in line with the prior literature of Cao et al. (2011).   
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6.1.4 Controlling for the lagged change in earnings  
 
EA represents the change in earnings growth from t-1 to t, and these terms are comprised of 
earnings in t, t-1 and t-2. I assume that the pattern is informative in a way that the lagged 
changes in earnings are not as informative as the current ones. I test this by replacing the cur-
rent EA with the lagged one in the regressions (1a) and (1b). The results suggest that the EA 
with one lag is still informative, but the two-lag EA starts already losing the significance to 
some extent especially for the negative EA. 
 
6.1.5 Using squared earnings variables  
 
I examine whether the inclusion of squared earnings and squared changes in earnings in the 
contemporaneous long-window returns model would affect the results. The squared earnings 
are meant to control for nonlinearities, but the outcome is that the EA coefficients are still 
highly significant, and the overall results remain unchanged. 
 
6.1.6 Predicting earnings beyond t+1  
 
I redefine the dependent variable in the earnings prediction tests in H2 by replacing the future 
earnings in t+1 with the future earnings in t+2 and t+3, and test whether this affects the EA 
information value. Like Cao et al. (2011), I also find consistent results that the current period 
EA affects also the future earnings in t+2 and t+3.  
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6.2 Robustness checks for using alternative measures of EA 
 
6.2.1 Deflating EA by market value of equity  
 
In order to measure how the EA deflator affects the results, I calculate the EA as the change in 
total dollar earnings in year t minus the change in total dollar earnings in year t-1, deflated by 
the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. Cao et al. (2011) report weaker statisti-
cal significances for dollar change earnings regressions, which are similar to my own results 
and suggest that the dollar-deflated positive EA coefficient is not significant. 
 
6.2.2 Measuring EA over a longer window  
 
I prolong the EA measurement period to the change in five-year earnings growth rates. Ac-
cording to the hypothesis, this should weaken mostly the short-window results, because the 
EA information would in this case be fairly old. My short-window results are not significant 
in the original setting, which is why I cannot draw inferences from the prolonged setting. For 
the long-window returns, the positive EA is not significant, which supports that the most re-
cent EA information is the most valuable, as expected. 
Up to this point, I have presented and analyzed all the research questions and performed an 
exhaustive set of robustness checks, which confirms my reported results also in a more gen-
eral setting. In the next chapter, I present the conclusions for my study. 
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7.  Conclusions 
 
In my thesis, I empirically study what drives current earnings acceleration, which is defined 
as the change in earnings growth, and whether it conveys valuable information to the inves-
tors in the European setting. The results strongly support the prior findings that the EA incre-
mentally explains the annual long-window returns, future earnings, and analyst forecast revi-
sions. My first research questions build on the prior work of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) and Cao et al. (2011), whereas my second research questions expands the existing lit-
erature and attempts to bring new insights by finding strong evidence that the EA information 
value derives from the cash flow and not from the accruals component of earnings. I also dis-
cover that the EA information is generally non-dependent on the company size and does not 
change over time.  
The prior EA literature studies only annual earnings reports. Whereas, in my study, I extend 
the analyses to cover also the quarterly data and I find significant results that the overall an-
nual and quarterly information value is very similar. However, based on my results, there are 
small differences in the specific EA patterns that convey this information, and the evidence 
suggests that the quarterly and annual information may have complementary value. Below, in 
the Table 17, I report summarized the results of all of my hypotheses for the two research 
questions. 
Finally, the EA literature remains still very scarce, and offers several interesting and unex-
ploited topics for further research. One suggested topic would be to further analyze the varia-
bles that the EA information is conditional on, and to study the possibility of constructing a 
profitable EA trading strategy. Conclusively, my study extends the academic literature of EA 
information value to the investors and contributes to the body of justifications, why in prac-
tice, so many investment managers and financial analysts take the EA information into con-
sideration. 
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Table 17: Summary results of the hypotheses 
 
In this table, I summarize the results for each of the eight hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses based on both 
annual and quarterly evidence. The short-window results show NBE = no base for evaluation, but otherwise my 
results are in general in line with those of prior literature, especially Cao et al. (2011).  
Hypo-
thesis 
 
 
 
 
Summary description 
Annual 
Results 
Quarterly  
Results 
H1a 
EA is a significant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous returns in 
long-window 
Strong  
support 
Strong  
support 
H1b 
EA is a significant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous returns in 
short-window 
NBE NBE 
H2 EA is a significant explanatory factor for the next period reported earnings 
Strong  
support 
Strong  
support 
H3 
EA is a significant explanatory factor for analyst 1- year earnings per share 
(EPS) forecast revisions around earnings report dates 
Moderate 
support 
No  
support 
H4a 
Both EA and analyst long-term EPS growth revision variables are significant 
explanatory factors for the contemporaneous returns in long-window 
Strong  
support 
Strong  
support 
H4b 
Both EA and analyst long-term EPS growth revision variables are significant 
explanatory factors for the contemporaneous returns in short-window 
NBE NBE 
H5a 
EA from the cash flow is more significant explanatory factor for the contem-
poraneous returns in long-window than EA from the accruals  
Strong  
support 
Strong  
support 
H5b 
EA from the cash flow is more significant explanatory factor for the contem-
poraneous returns in short-window than EA from the accruals 
NBE NBE 
H6a1 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous re-
turns in long-window for both large and middle cap companies 
Strong  
support 
No  
support 
H6a2 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous re-
turns in short-window for both large and middle cap companies 
NBE NBE 
H6b 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for explaining next period 
reported earnings for both large and middle cap companies 
Moderate 
support 
Strong  
support 
H6c 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for explaining analyst 5-year 
earnings per share (EPS) growth rate forecast revisions for both large and 
middle cap companies  
Moderate 
support 
No  
support 
H7 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the contemporaneous re-
turns in long-window before and after the year 2008 
Strong  
support 
NBE 
H8 
EA is a similarly significant explanatory factor for the quarterly and annual 
data analyses 
Strong support 
 
 
Strong support 
Moderate support 
No support / No base for evaluation (NBE) 
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9.  APPENDIX 
9.1 APPENDIX A. List of variables and their sources 
 
Table 18: Data availability justifying my sample period of 1995-2012 
 
Item Database 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Stock Price Datastream 55% 64% 77% 88% 95% 
Total Assets Worldscope 61% 73% 87% 94% 99% 
EBIT Worldscope 61% 73% 86% 94% 99% 
Equity Book Value Worldscope 62% 73% 87% 94% 99% 
Annual Dividends Reuters 7% 47% 72% 85% 91% 
Shares Outstanding Worldscope 57% 70% 83% 93% 99% 
Operating income Reuters 10% 66% 85% 94% 99% 
Operating Cash Flow Reuters 7% 53% 79% 94% 99% 
 
 
Table 19: List of variables and their sources 
 
Symbol Name Database Definition 
TA Total assets Worldscope TF.FN.TotalAssets 
BV Book value of equity Worldscope TF.FN.TotalCommonEquity 
EBIT EBIT Worldscope TF.FN.OperatingIncome 
D Dividends Reuters TF.RF.TotalCashDividendsPaid 
Shares Shares outstanding Worldscope TF.FN.CommonSharesOutstanding 
OI1 Net income before extraordinary items Reuters TF.RF.NetIncomeBeforeExtraItems 
OI2 Net income after taxes Reuters TF.RF.NetIncomeAfterTaxes 
FCAST Mean analyst EPS forecast I/B/E/S TF.ES.EPS.Mean 
OCF Operating cash flow Reuters TF.RF.CashFromOperatingActivities 
PClose Stock closing price Datastream Adjusted closing price in USD 
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Table 20: Annual distribution of annual and quarterly observations 
 
This table illustrates how the number of observations in the sample decreases as the distance from the end period 
year 2012, increases. The historical data availability issue is more severe with the quarterly than with the annual 
data, making the quarterly data distribution very skewed to the right 
Year % Annual % Quarterly 
1995 4.0% 1.0% 
1996 4.4% 1.0% 
1997 4.7% 1.0% 
1998 4.9% 1.2% 
1999 5.1% 2.1% 
2000 5.3% 0.9% 
2001 5.5% 3.6% 
2002 5.7% 5.7% 
2003 5.9% 6.6% 
2004 6.1% 7.3% 
2005 6.4% 7.6% 
2006 6.5% 8.4% 
2007 6.6% 8.9% 
2008 6.7% 9.2% 
2009 6.8% 9.5% 
2010 6.8% 9.7% 
2011 6.9% 10.1% 
2012 1.6% 6.0% 
 
 
 
9.2 APPENDIX B. Quarterly data regression tables  
 
Table 21: Descriptive statistics and correlations for quarterly data 
This table presents the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients for the quarterly data sample. 
The sample consists of 23 596 firm-quarter observations from 1995 to 2012. The variables are defined in the 
Table 4 and the EA partitions in the Figure 3. The EA partition statistics reported in Panels A-C are based on 
non-zero EAs in each partition. For example the mean of EA2 is based on 4 522 observations. All variables are 
winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5% to control for outliers. ***, **, and * indicate significances at 1, 5, 
and 10% levels based on two-tailed t-tests. The t statistics are based on the means and standard errors of the 
yearly values as in Newey-West (1987), and they are adjusted for serial correlation. 
  EA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
Panel A: Distribution of earnings acceleration 
     N 16 107 1 070 5 405 1 074 1 522 5 922 1 114 
N% 100% 7% 34% 7% 9% 37% 7% 
Mean (0.000) 0.022 0.027 (0.007) 0.011 (0.026) (0.021) 
Standard deviation 0.042 0.036 0.044 0.012 0.021 0.045 0.029 
Minimum (0.224) 0.000 0.000 (0.087) 0.000 (0.336) (0.210) 
Q1 (0.010) 0.004 0.004 (0.008) 0.001 (0.028) (0.025) 
Median (0.000) 0.011 0.012 (0.003) 0.004 (0.012) (0.012) 
Q3 0.010 0.024 0.030 (0.001) 0.012 (0.004) (0.005) 
Max 0.225 0.274 0.338 (0.000) 0.175 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Panel B: Key variables EA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
      ST-RETURN 
       N 13 120 688 3 678 741 939 3 994 751 
Mean 0.002 0.011 0.005 (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) (0.005) 
Median 0.000 0.008 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) (0.003) 
Std 0.062 0.060 0.063 0.065 0.061 0.062 0.070 
LT-RETURN 
       N 22 066 1 032 5 212 1 031 1 415 5 655 1 071 
Mean 0.163 0.146 0.150 0.172 0.197 0.162 0.141 
Median 0.113 0.101 0.108 0.116 0.150 0.108 0.078 
Std 0.502 0.470 0.498 0.552 0.499 0.504 0.586 
MARKET VALUE. (M$) 
      N 15 626 1 038 5 255 1 044 1 463 5 746 1 080 
Mean 8010 7520 8160 8440 6420 8150 8710 
Median 1940 1850 1940 2070 1900 1930 1970 
Std 17600 15000 17700 19300 13600 18000 19900 
EARNINGS 
       N 15 584 1 036 5 248 1 044 1 450 5 730 1 076 
Mean 0.019 0.042 0.024 0.010 0.029 0.015 -0.008 
Median 0.018 0.027 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.016 0.011 
Std 0.046 0.068 0.039 0.037 0.044 0.046 0.088 
CHANGE IN EARNINGS 
      N 15 584 1 036 5 248 1 044 1 450 5 730 1 076 
Mean 0.002 0.043 0.023 (0.018) 0.017 (0.018) (0.045) 
Median 0.001 0.015 0.007 (0.007) 0.007 (0.005) (0.015) 
Std 0.056 0.100 0.063 0.034 0.040 0.049 0.116 
EARNINGS GROWTH 
      N 16 107 1 070 5 405 1 074 1 522 5 922 1 114 
Mean 0.001 0.020 0.011 (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) (0.017) 
Median 0.000 0.010 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) (0.009) 
Std 0.025 0.033 0.025 0.016 0.017 0.023 0.026 
BOOK-TO-MARKET 
      N 15 626 1 038 5 255 1 044 1 463 5 746 1 080 
Mean 0.788 0.841 0.784 0.811 0.743 0.781 0.836 
Median 0.582 0.610 0.581 0.603 0.565 0.578 0.587 
Std 0.770 0.937 0.752 0.739 0.676 0.757 0.923 
ROA (T+1) 
       N 20221 1011 5089 1023 1399 5569 1072 
Mean 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.014 
Median 0.011 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 
Std 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.029 0.027 
CHANGE IN DIVIDENDS 
      N 6 272 368 1 872 419 527 2 116 488 
Mean (0.001) (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Median (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 0.000 
Std 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.020 
Panel C: Pearson correlations EA EA1 EA2 EA3 EA4 EA5 EA6 
ST-RETURN 0.038*** (0.029) 0.014 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.002 
LT-RETURN (0.010) 0.008 (0.009) (0.057)* 0.069*** (0.014) (0.014) 
MARKET VALUE. (M$) (0.001) (0.118)*** (0.083)*** 0.088*** (0.087)*** 0.084*** 0.112*** 
EARNINGS 0.200*** 0.248*** 0.031*** 0.157*** 0.137*** 0.208*** 0.331*** 
CHANGE IN EARNINGS 0.569*** 0.575*** 0.541*** 0.529*** 0.333*** 0.438*** 0.505*** 
EARNINGS GROWTH 0.829*** 0.924*** 0.838*** 0.787*** 0.635*** 0.764*** 0.842*** 
BOOK-TO-MARKET 0.004 (0.046) (0.047)*** 0.020 (0.075)*** 0.072*** 0.017 
ROA (T+1) 0.095*** 0.118*** 0.205*** (0.056)* 0.043 (0.004) (0.139)*** 
CHG IN DIVIDENDS 0.034*** (0.082) (0.005) 0.053 0.002 0.015 0.000 
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Table 22: Regression of three-day cumulative raw returns on EA 
This table presents the regression results of short-window returns around earnings announcement on EA. The 
dependent variable, Ri.t is three-day [-1; +1] cumulative stock return around annual earnings announcement for 
firm i in each fiscal year t. The results are obtained from 19 051 ﬁrm-year observations. All the other variables 
and regression characteristics are defined as in Table 7. 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model Model (1a) Model (1b) 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? (0.002) (0.28) (0.001) (0.23) (0.001) (0.14) 
Earnings + (0.043) (1.46) (0.040) (1.38) (0.044) (1.43) 
Neg. Earnings - (0.091) (0.80) (0.079) (0.76) (0.076) (0.76) 
∆Earnings + (0.000) 0.00 (0.017) (0.79) (0.022) (0.97) 
Neg. ∆Earnings - 0.026 0.73 0.014 0.33 0.011 0.22 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
0.042 1.56 
  NEA - Negative EA + 
  
0.060 1.31 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
0.214 2.42** 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
0.028 1.22 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
0.224 0.73 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
0.034 0.26 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
0.038 1.00 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
0.203 1.40 
ΔLagged equity BV - 0.081 1.26 0.090 1.20 0.086 1.18 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.052) (0.99) (0.062) (0.96) (0.056) (0.90) 
ΔDividends ? (0.002) (0.03) (0.016) (0.32) (0.007) (0.12) 
Book-to-market ? 0.005 0.97 0.004 0.87 0.005 0.95 
Adjusted R
2
   3.2%   3.4%   3.6%   
Number of observations 
 
3 211 
 
3 173 
 
3 173 
  
(1a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAi.t + a6NEAi.t + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + 
a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t +  ui.t       
(1b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EA(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 +  
a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t +  ui.t  
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Table 23: Quarterly regressions of annual raw returns on EA 
This table presents the regression results of quarterly buy-and-hold returns for ﬁrm i over the period 9 months 
before to 3 months after the ﬁrm’s t ﬁscal quarter end. The results are obtained from 23 596 firm-quarter obser-
vations. All other variables and regression characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred.  Benchmark model Model (1a) Model (1b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.174 14.49*** 0.185 14.23*** 0.188 14.10*** 
Earnings + 2.711 7.79*** 2.669 7.67*** 2.686 7.66*** 
Neg. Earnings - (3.088) (5.56)*** (3.077) (5.46)*** (3.072) (5.42)*** 
∆Earnings + 0.029 0.12 0.331 0.98 0.320 0.97 
Neg. ∆Earnings - 0.728 1.79* 0.252 0.48 0.159 0.30 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
(0.746) (2.15)** 
  NEA - Negative EA + 
  
0.631 2.07** 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
(2.697) (1.96)* 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
(0.685) (1.94)* 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
2.246 0.78 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
(0.432) (0.18) 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
0.661 2.15** 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
2.147 1.85* 
ΔLagged equity BV - (0.788) (6.47)*** (0.729) (5.97)*** (0.737) (5.98)*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.167) (0.93) (0.357) (1.89)* (0.341) (1.80)* 
ΔDividends ? (0.527) (2.22)** (0.563) (2.34)** (0.562) (2.32)** 
Book-to-market ? (0.147) (11.14)*** (0.160) (11.40)*** (0.161) (11.41)*** 
Adjusted R
2
   9.9%   10.3%   10.3%   
Number of observations 
 
5 928 
 
5 747 
 
5 747 
  
(1a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAi.t + a6NEAi.t + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + 
a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t +  ui.t       
(1b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EA(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 +  
a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t +  ui.t  
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Table 24: Quarterly regressions of future earnings on EA 
This table presents the regression results of one-year ahead future earnings on EA. The dependent variable Ei.t+1 
= ROAi.t+1. or operating income after depreciation for ﬁrm i in t + 1 scaled by total assets at the end of quarter t; 
D1 = an indicator set to 1 if ROAi.t is negative. 0 otherwise; D2 = an indicator set to 1 if ∆ROAi.t is negative, 0 
otherwise. The results are obtained from 23 596 firm-quarter observations. All other variables and regression 
characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred.  Benchmark model Model (1a) Model (1b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.020*** 23.77 0.017 17.74*** 0.017 17.26*** 
Earnings + 0.189*** 7.66 0.196 8.15*** 0.191 7.91*** 
Neg. Earnings - (0.060) (1.22) (0.100) (1.77)* (0.094) (1.62) 
∆Earnings - (0.030) (1.23) (0.120) (4.39)*** (0.116) (4.21)*** 
Neg. ∆Earnings + (0.011) (0.29) 0.172 3.56*** 0.158 3.25*** 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
0.175 4.83*** 
  NEA - Negative EA ? 
  
(0.144) (3.42)*** 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
0.424 3.34*** 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
0.165 4.72*** 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
0.133 0.68 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
0.479 2.73*** 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
(0.147) (3.33)*** 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
(0.132) (1.44) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.017 1.93* 0.015 1.64 0.016 1.71* 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.025) (1.99)** (0.019) (1.35) (0.021) (1.44) 
ΔDividends + (0.008) (0.70) (0.010) (0.85) (0.010) (0.84) 
Book-to-market - (0.012) (12.09)*** (0.010) (9.34)*** (0.010) (9.40)*** 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
9.3%   11.3%   11.4%   
Number of observations 
 
5 675 
 
5 492 
 
5 492 
  
(2a) : Ei.t+1 = b0 + b1Ei.t + b2(D1 * Ei.t) + b3ΔEi.t + b4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + b5PEAi.t + b6NEAi.t + b7ΔBi.t-1 + b8(D3 * ΔBi.t-
1) + b9ΔDi.t + b10BMi.t +  ei.t       
(2b) : Ei.t+1 = b0 + b1Ei.t + b2(D1 * Ei.t) + b3ΔEi.t + b4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + b5.k[EA(k)i.t] + b7ΔBi.t-1 +  
b8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + b9ΔDi.t + b10BMi.t +  ei.t       
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Table 25: Quarterly regressions of analyst forecast revision on EA 
This table presents the regression results of analyst one-year-ahead earnings forecast revision on EA. The de-
pendent variable, analyst 1-year-ahead earnings forecast revision (FRY1) is deﬁned as the natural logarithm of 
the percentage mean (consensus) analysts’ earnings forecast (EPS) revision of ﬁrm i for year t + 1 that becomes 
available to the market as soon as the quarterly earnings of year t are announced. The results are obtained from 
23 596 firm-quarter observations. All other variables and regression characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred.  Benchmark model Model (1a) Model (1b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? (2.786) (24.03)*** (2.865) (22.19)*** (2.916) 
(22.28)**
* 
Earnings ? (0.091) (0.03) 0.397 0.12 (0.247) (0.08) 
Neg. Earnings ? (0.430) (0.08) (0.704) (0.12) (0.721) (0.12) 
∆Earnings ? 4.701 1.39 1.173 0.31 0.808 0.22 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? (4.665) (0.82) (0.600) (0.10) 1.361 0.22 
PEA - Positive EA ? 
  
7.004 1.72* 
  NEA - Negative EA ? 
  
(2.110) (0.68) 
  EA1 - More positive ? 
    
2.014 1.55 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
    
7.194 1.69* 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
    
(6.359) (2.14)** 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
    
5.335 1.45 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
    
(2.986) (0.93) 
EA6 - More negative ? 
    
(1.395) (1.52) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? 1.575 1.33 1.730 1.43 1.882 1.54 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (3.793) (1.94)* (3.916) (1.95)* (4.281) (2.10)** 
ΔDividends ? 0.346 0.14 0.288 0.12 0.617 0.25 
Book-to-market ? 0.390 3.30*** 0.432 3.57*** 0.443 3.66*** 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
9.3%   11.3%   11.4%   
Number of observations 
 
640 
 
634 
 
634 
  
(3a) :  FRYi.t = c0 + c1Ei.t + c2(D1 * Ei.t) + c3ΔEi.t + c4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + c5PEAi.t + c6NEAi.t + c7ΔBi.t-1 + c8(D3 * ΔBi.t-
1) + c9ΔDi.t + c10BMi.t +  ςi.t       
(3b) : FRYi.t = c0 + c1Ei.t + c2(D1 * Ei.t) + c3ΔEi.t + c4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + c5.k[EA(k)i.t] + c7ΔBi.t-1 +  
c8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + c9ΔDi.t + c10BMi.t +  ςi.t       
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Table 26: Regressions of three-day returns on EA and the change in forecasts 
This table presents the regression results of short-window stock returns on earnings acceleration and the change 
in analysts’ long-term-growth forecasts. The dependent variable, Ri.t is three-day [-1; +1] cumulative stock return 
around annual earnings announcement for firm i in each fiscal year t and the ΔLTG is the mean (consensus) 
analysts’ forecast of long-term growth in earnings (5y EPS growth rate) immediately after earnings announce-
ment minus the last available forecast immediately before the announcement. The results are obtained from 19 
051 ﬁrm-year observations. All the other variables and regression characteristics are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred.  Benchmark model Model (4a) Model (4b) 
  Sign  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? (0.014) (1.03) (0.014) (0.99) (0.013) (1.00) 
Earnings + 0.004 0.11 0.001 0.02 0.006 0.18 
Neg. Earnings - (0.399) (1.11) (0.379) (1.09) (0.391) (1.13) 
∆Earnings + (0.076) (1.35) (0.102) (1.39) (0.119) (1.62) 
Neg. ∆Earnings - 0.161 1.24 0.169 1.17 0.178 1.26 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
0.061 1.12 
  NEA - Negative EA + 
  
0.035 0.75 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
0.347 2.21** 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
0.054 1.00 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
0.193 0.56 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
(0.064) (0.29) 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
0.015 0.33 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
0.231 1.57 
ΔLagged equity BV - 0.174 1.13 0.187 1.11 0.182 1.09 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.159) (0.99) (0.177) (0.99) (0.167) (0.95) 
ΔDividends ? (0.034) (0.40) (0.055) (0.69) (0.044) (0.55) 
Book-to-market ? 0.011 1.22 0.011 1.16 0.011 1.20 
∆LT-forecast growth + 0.068 2.48** 0.069 2.51** 0.076 2.71*** 
Adjusted R
2
 9.4%   9.6%   10.1%   
Number of observations 1 682 
 
1 665 
 
1 665 
  
(4a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAi.t + a6NEAi.t + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + 
a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + a11ΔLTGi.t + εi.t    
(4b) :Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EA(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 +  
 a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + a11ΔLTGi.t + εi.t  
  
 87 
 
Table 27: Quarterly regressions of annual returns on EA and the change in forecasts  
This table presents the regression results of analyst one-year-ahead earnings forecast revision on EA. The de-
pendent variable, Ri.t is annual buy-and-hold return for ﬁrm i over the period 9 months before to 3 months after 
the ﬁrm’s t ﬁscal quarter end, and the ΔLTG is the mean (consensus) analysts’ forecast of long-term growth in 
earnings (5y EPS growth rate) immediately after earnings announcement minus the last available forecast imme-
diately before the announcement. The results are obtained from 23 596 firm-quarter observations. All other vari-
ables and regression characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred. Benchmark model Model (4a) Model (4b) 
  Sign Coef. t stat Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.170 7.41*** 0.192 7.52*** 0.195 7.35*** 
Earnings + 1.997 2.97*** 1.919 2.73*** 2.004 2.83*** 
Neg. Earnings - (5.507) (4.99)*** (5.145) (4.39)*** (5.255) (4.54)*** 
∆Earnings + 1.513 2.63*** 2.174 2.81*** 2.281 2.88*** 
Neg. ∆Earnings - 1.426 1.54 0.230 0.20 0.024 0.02 
PEA - Positive EA + 
  
(1.183) (2.02)** 
  NEA - Negative EA + 
  
0.773 1.42 
  EA1 - More positive + 
    
(3.979) (2.05)** 
EA2 - Revert to positive + 
    
(1.205) (1.97)** 
EA3 - Less negative + 
    
1.227 0.29 
EA4 - Less positive + 
    
(3.156) (0.73) 
EA5 - Revert to negative + 
    
0.707 1.34 
EA6 - More negative + 
    
2.753 1.40 
ΔLagged equity BV - (1.321) (4.56)*** (1.304) (4.46)*** (1.328) (4.42)*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.513) (0.94) (0.514) (0.94) (0.465) (0.84) 
ΔDividends ? (1.495) (3.55)*** (1.506) (3.50)*** (1.526) (3.53)*** 
Book-to-market ? (0.205) (8.34)*** (0.221) (8.48)*** (0.222) (8.41)*** 
∆LT-forecast growth + 0.536 4.24*** 0.543 4.22*** 0.546 4.21*** 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
14.0%   14.3%   14.3%   
Number of observations 
 
2 462 
 
2 604 
 
2 604 
  
 
       (4a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAi.t + a6NEAi.t + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) +
a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + a11ΔLTGi.t + εi.t      
(4b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EA(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 +  
a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + a11ΔLTGi.t + εi.t      
.  
  
88 
 
Table 28: Quarterly regressions of annual returns on EA of cash flow and accruals 
This table presents the regression results for the EA that derives from either cash flow or accruals component of earnings. The dependent variable Ri.t is the annual buy-and-
hold return for ﬁrm i. EAOCF is the cash flow component, and EAACCRUALS is the accruals EA component. The results are obtained from 23 596 firm-quarter observations. All 
other variables and regression characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model  Model (5a)  Model (5b) 
  CASH ACCRUALS  CASH ACCRUALS  CASH ACCRUALS 
  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat  Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.172 13.98*** 0.170 13.56*** 
 
0.184 13.13*** 0.178 11.98*** 
 
0.174 12.01*** 0.177 11.42*** 
Earnings ? 2.641 7.61*** 2.574 7.30*** 
 
2.647 7.63*** 2.593 7.37*** 
 
2.607 7.65*** 2.593 7.37*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (3.221) (5.73)*** (3.231) (5.54)*** 
 
(3.219) (5.72)*** (3.235) (5.54)*** 
 
(3.188) (5.71)*** (3.238) (5.56)*** 
∆Earnings ? (0.024) (0.09) (0.062) (0.23) 
 
(0.008) (0.03) (0.047) (0.18) 
 
(0.005) (0.02) (0.039) (0.14) 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? 1.043 2.49** 1.098 2.48** 
 
1.026 2.44** 1.057 2.38** 
 
1.031 2.46** 1.057 2.38** 
EA ? 0.004 0.06 0.031 0.42 
  
        
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
(0.193) (1.53) (0.077) (0.61) 
 
    
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
0.197 1.69* 0.151 1.17 
   
  
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
0.175 0.31 0.242 0.91 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
(0.353) (2.74)*** (0.155) (1.19) 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
8.142 2.77*** (0.151) (0.28) 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
1.547 2.69*** (0.528) (1.14) 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
0.193 1.45 0.206 1.57 
EA6 - More negative 
? 
          
(0.091) (0.50) (0.075) (0.16) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.767) (6.00)*** (0.745) (5.67)*** 
 
(0.773) (6.00)*** (0.746) (5.67)*** 
 
(0.783) (6.04)*** (0.745) (5.67)*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.309) (1.61) (0.391) (1.96)** 
 
(0.308) (1.60) (0.396) (1.98)** 
 
(0.307) (1.58) (0.400) (2.01)** 
ΔDividends ? (0.543) (2.04)** (0.611) (2.30)** 
 
(0.504) (1.89)* (0.590) (2.21)** 
 
(0.567) (2.11)** (0.644) (2.37)** 
Book-to-market ? (0.149) (11.05)*** (0.151) (10.90)*** 
 
(0.152) (11.08)*** (0.154) (10.88)*** 
 
(0.148) (10.99)*** (0.153) (10.81)*** 
Adjusted R^2 
10.1%   9.8%     10.2%   9.9%     10.7%   9.9% 
 
Number of observations 5 718 
 
5 557 
  
5 718 
 
5 557 
  
5 718 
 
5 557 
 
(5a) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEAOCF/ACCRUALS + a6NEAOCF/ACCRUALS + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t              
(5b) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EAOCF/ACCRUALS(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t            
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Table 29: Quarterly regressions of annual raw returns on large and middle cap EA 
This table presents the regression results for the EA that derives from either middle or large cap firms. The dependent variable Ei.t+1 is operating income after depreciation for 
ﬁrm i in t + 1 scaled by total assets at the end of year t. EALARGE is the EA for the large and EAMIDDLE is the EA for the middle cap subsample. The results are obtained from 
23 596 firm-quarter observations. All other variables and regression characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model   Model (6a2)   Model (6b2) 
    LARGE MIDDLE   LARGE MIDDLE   LARGE MIDDLE 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.190 12.35*** 0.156 8.53*** 
 
0.181 11.11*** 0.184 9.42*** 
 
0.183 11.06*** 0.187 9.20*** 
Earnings ? 1.970 5.50*** 3.240 5.54*** 
 
1.982 5.56*** 3.252 5.52*** 
 
2.008 5.54*** 3.280 5.54*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (1.491) (2.50)** (4.460) (5.11)*** 
 
(1.620) (2.69)*** (4.224) (4.94)*** 
 
(1.662) (2.73)*** (4.212) (4.90)*** 
∆Earnings ? (0.289) (0.83) 0.004 0.01 
 
(0.603) (1.52) 0.683 1.43 
 
(0.524) (1.34) 0.658 1.40 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? 0.756 1.54 1.439 2.28** 
 
1.399 2.19** (0.026) (0.03) 
 
1.255 1.95* (0.131) (0.17) 
EA ? 0.048 0.14 (0.103) (0.44) 
          
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
0.765 1.37 (1.354) (3.15)*** 
     
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
(0.604) (0.98) 1.005 2.80*** 
     
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
(0.046) (0.02) (3.985) (2.33)** 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
0.688 1.22 (1.239) (2.90)*** 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
2.831 0.50 1.851 0.57 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
(0.236) (0.08) 0.310 0.09 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
(0.598) (0.96) 1.076 2.87*** 
EA6 - More negative ? 
          
(0.182) (0.08) 2.775 2.04** 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.654) (4.08)*** (0.745) (4.30)*** 
 
(0.665) (4.16)*** (0.727) (4.24)*** 
 
(0.670) (4.11)*** (0.736) (4.27)*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.063) (0.27) (0.650) (2.33)** 
 
(0.041) (0.18) (0.697) (2.50)** 
 
(0.032) (0.13) (0.677) (2.42)** 
ΔDividends ? (0.135) (0.48) (1.079) (2.75)*** 
 
(0.157) (0.56) (1.146) (2.91)*** 
 
(0.159) (0.56) (1.139) (2.87)*** 
Book-to-market ? (0.121) (6.90)*** (0.167) (9.00)*** 
 
(0.115) (6.57)*** (0.191) (9.47)*** 
 
(0.116) (6.65)*** (0.191) (9.46)*** 
Adjusted R2 7.3%   12.1%     7.4%   12.6%     7.5%   12.6%   
Number of observations 2 355 
 
3 392 
  
2 355 
 
3 392 
  
2 355 
 
3 392 
 (6a1) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1 * Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2 * ΔEi.t) + a5PEALARGE/MIDDLE + a6NEALARGE/MIDDLE + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3 * ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t    
(6b1) : Ri.t = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EALARGE/MIDDLE(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t                   
 90 
 
Table 30: Quarterly regressions of future earnings on large and middle cap EA 
This table presents the regression results for the earnings acceleration that derives from either middle or large cap firms. The dependent variable Ri.t is the annual buy-and-
hold return for ﬁrm i. EALARGE is the EA for the large cap subsample and EAMIDDLE is the EA for the middle cap subsample. The results are obtained from 23 596 firm-quarter 
observations. All other variables and regression characteristics in are defined as in Table 7 
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model   Model (6a2)   Model (6b2) 
    LARGE MIDDLE   LARGE MIDDLE   LARGE MIDDLE 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? 0.019 19.68*** 0.020 15.13*** 
 
0.016 14.92*** 0.018 11.64*** 
 
0.015 14.34*** 0.017 11.17*** 
Earnings ? 0.182 5.65*** 0.214 5.59*** 
 
0.191 6.15*** 0.212 5.78*** 
 
0.191 6.53*** 0.203 5.36*** 
Neg. Earnings ? (0.063) (1.02) (0.087) (1.21) 
 
(0.112) (1.63) (0.108) (1.41) 
 
(0.125) (1.76)* (0.096) (1.23) 
∆Earnings ? (0.007) (0.19) (0.054) (1.40) 
 
(0.125) (3.41)*** (0.122) (3.11)*** 
 
(0.123) (3.32)*** (0.127) (3.32)*** 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? (0.033) (0.56) 0.022 0.41 
 
0.195 2.71*** 0.168 2.55** 
 
0.195 2.74*** 0.168 2.55** 
EA ? (0.015) (0.42) 0.009 0.29 
          
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
0.247 3.42*** 0.138 3.59*** 
     
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
(0.236) (4.81)*** (0.101) (1.79)* 
     
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
0.336 1.16 0.459 3.19*** 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
0.249 3.89*** 0.133 3.42*** 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
(0.651) (1.71)* 0.319 1.42 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
0.545 2.63*** 0.467 1.92* 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
(0.263) (4.94)*** (0.110) (1.89)* 
EA6 - More negative ? 
          
(0.211) (1.54) (0.122) (1.07) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? (0.011) (1.00) 0.039 2.98*** 
 
(0.013) (1.29) 0.037 2.78*** 
 
(0.014) (1.37) 0.039 2.80*** 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.019 1.25 (0.063) (2.84)*** 
 
0.025 1.67* (0.058) (2.54)** 
 
0.027 1.76* (0.060) (2.57)*** 
ΔDividends ? (0.002) (0.21) (0.015) (0.66) 
 
(0.009) (0.83) (0.008) (0.36) 
 
(0.007) (0.65) (0.008) (0.37) 
Book-to-market ? (0.010) (7.58)*** (0.013) (9.80)*** 
 
(0.008) (6.17)*** (0.011) (7.58)*** 
 
(0.008) (6.30)*** (0.011) (7.45)*** 
Adjusted R^2 11.4%   9.3%     15.7%   10.3%     16.2%   10.7%   
Number of observations 2 225 
 
3 267 
  
2 225 
 
3 267 
  
2 225 
 
3 267 
 (6a2) : Ei.t+1 = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5PEALARGE/MIDDLE + a6NEALARGE/MIDDLE + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t     
(6b2) : Ei.t+1 = a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EALARGE/MIDDLE(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t               
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Table 31: Quarterly regressions of growth forecasts on large and middle cap EA 
This table presents the regression results for the EA that derives from either middle or large cap firms. The dependent variable ∆LTG is the change in mean analysts’ forecast 
of long-term growth in EPS immediately after earnings announcement minus the last available forecast immediately before the announcement. EALARGE is the EA for the 
large and EAMIDDLE is the EA for the middle cap subsample. The results are obtained from 23 596 firm-quarter observations.  
Independent variable Pred. Sign Benchmark model   Model (6a3)   Model (6b3) 
    LARGE MIDDLE   LARGE MIDDLE   LARGE MIDDLE 
    Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat   Coef. t stat Coef. t stat 
Intercept ? (0.003) (0.53) 0.001 0.15 
 
0.002 0.37 (0.003) (0.40) 
 
0.000 0.04 (0.006) (0.82) 
Earnings ? 0.006 0.02 (0.261) (1.37) 
 
(0.046) (0.19) (0.241) (1.26) 
 
(0.017) (0.07) (0.250) (1.23) 
Neg. Earnings ? (0.172) (0.63) 0.102 0.33 
 
(0.079) (0.29) 0.009 0.03 
 
(0.116) (0.40) 0.035 0.11 
∆Earnings ? 0.043 0.23 (0.150) (0.83) 
 
0.181 0.87 (0.264) (1.28) 
 
0.170 0.81 (0.271) (1.28) 
Neg. ∆Earnings ? 0.041 0.16 0.314 1.01 
 
(0.215) (0.72) 0.555 1.50 
 
(0.113) (0.39) 0.607 1.61 
EA ? (0.139) (0.91) 0.129 1.42 
          
PEA - Positive EA ? 
     
(0.422) (1.68)* 0.293 1.97** 
     
NEA - Negative EA ? 
     
0.108 0.42 (0.023) (0.17) 
     
EA1 - More positive ? 
          
(0.691) (1.11) 0.504 0.94 
EA2 - Revert to positive ? 
          
(0.388) (1.52) 0.249 1.74* 
EA3 - Less negative ? 
          
(1.520) (1.45) (1.643) (0.91) 
EA4 - Less positive ? 
          
(0.419) (0.47) 2.689 1.14 
EA5 - Revert to negative ? 
          
0.063 0.24 0.011 0.07 
EA6 - More negative ? 
          
(0.520) (1.06) (0.811) (1.17) 
ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.024 0.23 0.007 0.09 
 
0.021 0.20 0.009 0.13 
 
0.019 0.18 0.021 0.28 
Neg. ΔLagged equity BV ? 0.086 0.55 (0.044) (0.33) 
 
0.097 0.61 (0.050) (0.39) 
 
0.097 0.62 (0.071) (0.54) 
ΔDividends ? 0.302 1.31 (0.147) (1.29) 
 
0.309 1.34 (0.142) (1.24) 
 
0.316 1.37 (0.144) (1.25) 
Book-to-market ? 0.008 1.25 0.012 1.51 
 
0.005 0.81 0.014 1.74* 
 
0.006 0.99 0.015 1.87* 
Adjusted R^2 1.7%   0.7%     2.0%   0.8%     2.2%   1.4%   
Number of observations 1 206 
 
1 373 
  
1 206 
 
1 373 
  
1 206 
 
1 373 
 (6a3) : ∆LTG i.t =a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5PEALARGE/MIDDLE + a6NEALARGE/MIDDLE + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3*ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t  
 
(6b3) : ∆LTG i.t =a0 + a1Ei.t + a2(D1*Ei.t) + a3ΔEi.t + a4(D2*ΔEi.t) + a5.k[EALARGE/MIDDLE(k)i.t] + a7ΔBi.t-1 + a8(D3* ΔBi.t-1) + a9ΔDi.t + a10BMi.t + εi.t      
